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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis provides empirical evidence which challenges the argument articulated 
by Rory Leishman (2006), Andrew Petter (2010) and others that Canada’s system of 
governance is becoming increasingly authoritarian, as unelected judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies exert greater influence over policy processes and outcomes. It also serves 
to inform the ongoing public discussion that Canada’s Security Intelligence Review 
Committee (SIRC) called for in its 2009-2010 Report regarding the future of security 
intelligence review in Canada and, more particularly, the question of “whether the status 
quo meets the goals of the Government of Canada along with the expectations of citizens 
(SIRC: 2010, 3). 
 
 The intent of this thesis is to examine the degree of influence that two such 
unelected bodies – the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) and SIRC – are able to exert on 
the cabinet and Parliament in their review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS). The thesis will also illuminate the distinct but complementary functions of the 
SCC and SIRC, as external review mechanisms for the security intelligence activities of 
the executive branch of government.  
 
Toward that end, the thesis employs dialogue theory as a conceptual and 
analytical framework. As a conceptual framework, dialogue theory postulates that a 
dialogue is carried on between judicial or quasi-judicial bodies and elected lawmakers, in 
which Parliament retains the final say. Utilizing dialogue theory as an analytical 
framework, the thesis examines SCC decisions and SIRC case reports related to CSIS 
activities, which form one side of a dialogue or exchange that occurs between the SCC 
and SIRC, on the one hand, and the cabinet and Parliament on the other in relation to 
security intelligence matters in Canada. More specifically, it examines the instances 
where SCC and SIRC have determined that the activities of CSIS have violated the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) enacted in 1982, the CSIS Act 
enacted in 1984, or any other applicable statute or regulation. 
 
  The central argument and major conclusion of this thesis is that the SCC and 
SIRC have shown significant respect for Parliament’s constitutional authority to make 
laws, and the Cabinet’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations, while 
demonstrating a strong commitment to upholding individual rights. The evidence shows 
that when conducting reviews of intelligence collection activities, both the SCC and 
SIRC have been able to achieve the delicate balance noted in the Senate report of 1984 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Historical Antecedents of External Security Intelligence Review: The FLQ Crisis 
to Constitutional Reform and the CSIS Act (1960 – 1984) 
  In order to fully appreciate the function of security intelligence review in Canada, 
one must understand the context in which the review system emerged. More specifically, 
one must examine the factors that brought about the system and the issues that the 
architects of this system sought to address.  
 Revelations made by Solicitor General Francis Fox in 1977 of illegal RCMP 
activities against the Parti Quebecois and other Quebec sovereigntists exposed major 
deficiencies in the governance framework for the security intelligence activities of the 
Canadian government. To address such deficiencies, Trudeau appointed the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP (McDonald Commission). 
This initiative ultimately led to the implementation of the CSIS Act, which separated 
intelligence gathering from law enforcement by creating the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS) and its principle review and oversight body, the Security 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).  
 In response to the wider disaffection in Quebec resulting from the FLQ crisis and 
official abuses of power, Trudeau initiated a separate, but not unrelated process of 
constitutional reform, which led to the constitutional entrenchment of a Canadian charter 
of rights and freedoms.  As a result, the courts have joined SIRC as a de facto review 
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mechanism for the activities of CSIS, hearing a number of Charter-challenges related to 
the Service’s operations, such as the case of Khadr v. Canada. 
1.1.1 The FLQ Crisis 
 The Solicitor General’s revelations of illegal RCMP activities represented the 
culmination of an intense battle between federal and Quebec nationalist forces, which can 
be traced back to the Quiet Revolution of the1960s. The 1960s in Quebec, as elsewhere 
in North America, was a time of dramatic social and political upheaval. The province’s 
once conservative and compliant polity, having passively allowed 15 years of autocratic 
rule by Premier Maurice Duplessis (1936-39, 1944-59), was transformed by a defiant 
form of civic engagement . This resulted in the proliferation of both social movements 
and “groundbreaking public policy initiatives” (Clément, 2008: 162). During this decade, 
the movement for an independent Quebec emerged and was led primarily by the Parti 
Quebecois which won seven seats and 23.1% of the Quebec vote in 1970 by appealing to 
the popular “frustration and resentment to[wards] the Government” (Ibid., 163). This 
period also produced one of Canada’s first modern terrorist organizations – the Front de 
Liberation de Québec (FLQ).  
 In 1966, while in custody awaiting trial on a number of charges from bombings to 
murder, one of the intellectual leaders of the FLQ – Pierre Valliéres – wrote the 
influential book entitled Nègres blanc d'Amérique.  Effectively, the book was an ‘appel 
sous les drapeaux’ or a “call to arms” under a new flag (Clement, 2008). Four years later, 
on October 5, 1970, associates of Mr. Valliéres kidnapped British diplomat James Cross. 
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Another faction of the FLQ targeted Canada’s Immigration and Labour Minister Pierre 
Laporte, kidnapping Laporte in Saint-Lambert, as he played football on his front lawn 
with his family (CBC, 1980).  
 This initiated one of the most extensive “manhunts in Canadian history” 
(Clement, 2008). Police conducted over 1,000 raids and arrested roughly 50 people for 
questioning (Fournier 1984, 221-22). The military was deployed, and began patrolling 
Montreal streets on October 12th. By October 15th, “six thousand troops …[had been] 
stationed in Montreal” (Clément, 2008: 166).  
 Amidst violent student protests, the recently opened Université de Québec à 
Montréal was forced to close (Ibid.). On October 16, Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, 
in conjunction with Robert Bourassa, wrote to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau affirming 
that an insurrection was underway and asking the federal government to intervene (Ibid.). 
Shortly after this, Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act. The next day, Pierre Laporte 
was found dead in the trunk of an abandoned car (CBC, 1980).i   
 The Canadian public’s response to the invocation of the War Measure Act, and 
the subsequent violation of the rights of Canadian citizens, was divided between 
“enthusiastic support and bitter opposition” (Clément, 2008:171). In Parliament, support 
for the War Measures Act was almost unanimous. Led by party leader Tommy Douglas, 
only the sixteen New Democratic Party MPs voted against its invocation on October 19th 
1970 (Clément, 2008).ii 
 Almost immediately, police mobilized against terrorists and anyone suspected of 
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giving them support. Over 3,000 searches were conducted and 497 people arrested (Ibid., 
167). By their actions, the police demonstrated a clear bias against Quebec nationalists, 
and anyone considered to be “leftist” (Cardin 1990, 81-82). Pierre Vallières was among 
the first arrested. Aside from the FLQ members who were complicit in the kidnappings, 
“only two [of the individuals detained]…were convicted under the Public Order 
Regulations (Clément, 2008: 167). According to Thomas Berger, former MP and leader 
of the British Columbia New Democratic Party, "the whole exercise…reveals how 
unwise it is to have such extraordinary power easily available to any government" (1981, 
209).  
 All those arrested under the War Measures Act were denied due process. Habeas 
corpus, the individual’s right to judicial confirmation of legal detainment, was also 
suspended. Held with no right to outside communication, detainees were prevented from 
seeking legal counsel. During this time, association with the FLQ was a serious criminal 
and punishable offence, for which guilt was determined not in a court of law but in effect 
through executive decree (Clément, 2008). 
 Suppression of the media was not uncommon, including both student newspapers 
and mainstream media outlets. Prominent media figures were detained and questioned 
including Journal de Montréal photographer Yves Fabre and CKAC radio host Louis 
Fournier (Ibid.). E.S. Hallman, vice-president of Radio Canada warned his commentators 
about reporting on the events, and three reporters were subsequently dismissed for an 
apparent lack of objectivity (Ibid.).  
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Rights violations were not limited to Quebec under the Act. Members of the 
Vancouver Liberation Front were arrested for distributing the FLQ manifesto (Ibid). In 
what is remembered as a moment of rash-extremism, British Columbia Premier W.A.C. 
Bennett declared that his government had approved a regulatory decree that teachers be 
banned from expressing sympathy to the FLQ (Clément, 2008).   
 1.1.2 RCMP Actions in Relation to the Parti Quebecois 
 Apart from the larger constitutional issues, the other major factor that influenced 
the philosophy and policies related to the creation of CSIS, and its review and oversight 
systems,iii, was the RCMP’s illegal activities in relation to the Parti Quebecois. Those 
activities occurred as a result of a preoccupation with the emergence of a number of 
social and political movements in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Quebec 
independence movement.  
 In November 1976, the Parti Quebecois came to power in one of the most 
stunning provincial election victories in history. Canadians had trouble believing that this 
sovereigntist party, led by René Lévesque, could win a provincial election, and they were 
very concerned about the implications that this would have for national unity, harmony 
and internal security. 
 In 1977, Solicitor General Francis Fox revealed that the RCMP had undertaken 
illegal activities against the Parti Quebecois and other Quebec sovereigntists, including 
break-ins, bombings, barn-burnings, theft of a Parti Quebecois members list, entering 
premises without warrant, and other subversive activities (Cléroux, 1990). Subversive 
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activities against an organization openly engaged in violence and terrorist activities was 
one thing, but when it was revealed that the RCMP had also been spying on the Parti 
Quebecois, seen by many Quebecois as the legitimate and peaceful alternative to the 
FLQ, the crisis in Quebec reached a fever-like pitch.  
 Across the country, and particularly in Quebec, an atmosphere of crisis was 
perceptible (Ibid).  The Solicitor General’s revelations further exacerbated the feelings of 
alienation that had existed in Quebec for more than a century, and added increased fervor 
to the movement for an independent Quebec. The revelations also contributed to the 
decision of the Parti Quebecois to hold the 1980 Quebec referendum, in which 40.34% of 
voters supported Premier Lévesque’s proposal for a new relationship with Canada based 
on the idea of an “equality of nations” (CBC, 2010a).  
 When the Trudeau Liberals were re-elected in 1980 on a platform of national 
unity, the consensus across Canada that something had to be done to safeguard the civil 
and political rights of Canadians. It was largely in response to the sovereigntist 
movement and other even more de-stabilizing political developments in Quebec that 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau initiated one of the most extensive political reform 
projects in Canadian history, following his election victory. This included the 
appointment of the McDonald Commission, constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the implementation of the CSIS Act. 
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 1.1.3 Report of McDonald Royal Commission and the CSIS Act 
 In 1981, the McDonald Commission tabled its report in Parliament. The Report 
identified serious flaws in the auditing system for the activities of the RCMP (Senate, 
1983). To address this problem it recommended the separation of security and 
intelligence activities, which was to be achieved through the creation of a new civilian 
intelligence agency, to be called the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. To address 
issues related to control and accountability, the McDonald Commission also called for 
the creation of a civilian body to review the activities of CSIS, to be called the Security 
Intelligence Review Committee. This was achieved through the federal government’s 
drafting of Bill C-157 (CSIS Act), which was amended and approved by the Senate.   
1.1.4 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 Shortly after the Quebec referendum (1980), Trudeau sought for a second time to 
patriate the Constitution . He had promised constitutional reform after a debate with 
Renée Levésque, depending on Quebeckers’ vote on the question of a ‘sovereign 
association’ posed in the referendum (CBC News, 1980). During the constitutional 
negotiations which followed in 1980-1982 Trudeau fought for an entrenched Charter of 
Rights and Freedom, a measure that was vehemently opposed by the provincial Premiers 
but that would be supported by Canadians.  
  The wide-ranging effects of the Charter are beyond the scope of this research. 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore the Charter’s impact in increasing the scope of the 
review function of the judiciary in a critical area of Canadian public policy –– security 
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intelligence. More specifically, the thesis will examine a number of highly publicized 
cases when Canadian citizens brought charges against CSIS, using the Charter as the 
basis of their challenge; the cases are Khadr v. Canada and Charkaoui v. Canada. As a 
result of the combined effects of the Charter and the CSIS Act, Canada has established 
one of the world’s most effective external security intelligence review systems in the 
world (Farson, 2010).  
 1.1.5 Debate on the Effects of the CSIS Act and the Charter  
 Almost three decades since the implementation of the CSIS Act and entrenchment 
of the Charter, significant differences remain as to how these two initiatives have 
affected: a) the performance of security intelligence review in the country; and b) the 
balance of power between elected (national cabinet, Parliament) and unelected (SCC, 
SIRC) officials in Canada. 
 Intelligence officials have reported to the Special Senate Committee on Security 
and Intelligence (SSCSI) that no parliamentary committee in the world has close to the 
access to its own domestic intelligence agencies that SIRC has to CSIS (Ibid.) 
Furthermore, a former Solicitor General has told the SSCSI that Canada possesses a 
review and oversight system that other countries desire to emulate (Farson, 2000: 225).  
 Conversely, former intelligence officials, such as Mike Frost and Brian McInnis, have 
lamented the ineffectiveness of the review regime, referring to SIRC as more of a 
“lapdog” than a “watchdog” (Farson, 1996).  
  9 
However, the view that SIRC is a toothless organization with no formal authority 
to check the intrusive powers of Government is a mischaracterization of the review and 
reporting powers at SIRC’s disposal, as it overlooks two key facts.  
First, SIRC is not prohibited from criticizing Ministers or other Members of 
Parliament if they are found to be complicit in CSIS’s misdeeds, by virtue of any action 
or inaction. SIRC demonstrated its willingness to exercise this power in its review of the 
Heritage Front Affair, in which it deemed policy guidelines provided by the Solicitor 
General to CSIS to be seriously deficient. Secondly, the legal authority of SIRC Reports 
was significantly strengthened by the Federal Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in 
Robert Thomson v. Her Majesty the Queen, which stated that “deputy ministers and their 
equivalents must treat a Committee recommendation as a [judicial] decision; [and that] 
Committee recommendations may no longer be treated as mere informed advice” (SIRC, 
1990: 56). 
 Leishman and Petter argue that in Canada, judicial bodies now have supreme 
control over judicial and legislative processes, and that unelected officials continuously 
dictate legislative policy over the heads of the democratically elected representatives of 
the people of Canada (2006, 3). Furthermore, they take the view that rule by the courts 
and parliamentary sovereignty are diametrically opposed, (Bingham, 2010), as unelected 
bodies necessarily assume roles once reserved exclusively for the elected branches, and 
that this undermines the country’s democratic character.  
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Dialogue theory is an attempt to reconcile these contending viewpoints, by 
offering a middle-ground approach that recognizes the significant legal authority of 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, while denying finality to their decisions and 
pronouncements. Strong courts – with the capacity to invalidate legislation – and stronger 
legislatures – with the capacity to override these decisions – are unique features of 
Canadian constitutional democracy that are facilitated by the symbolic and substantive 
powers granted to legislatures to override and suspend judicial decisions under Section 1 
(reasonable limits clause) and Section 33 (notwithstanding clause) of the Charter (Roach, 
2001).  
  
1.2  Purpose of the Study 
  There is a continuous need to evaluate the performance of those institutions and 
agencies charged with upholding our most fundamental values and human rights. There is 
no other study that examines SIRC and the Canadian courts in tandem, in their respective 
roles of reviewing the activities and actions of CSIS in relation to the rights of individuals 
and groups; in short, there is little understanding of how CSIS is held to account. This 
study will be the first to propose a conceptual framework for understanding the external 
control and accountability system for CSIS, including both the courts and SIRC –– for 
the purpose of exploring the performance of the independent civilian intelligence review 
in Canada. It thus lays the groundwork for a more robust discussions and understanding 
of the nature of security intelligence review in Canada.   
           The thesis will focus on SCC decisions and SIRC Reports. Specifically, it will 
look at instances in which the SCC and SIRC have criticized or negated CSIS policies on 
  11 
the grounds that they violate the Charter, the CSIS Act, or some other applicable 
legislation or guidelines. It will explore whether in such instances, the SCC and SIRC 
have respected Parliament’s authority to make laws, and Cabinet’s authority over foreign 
affairs, while remaining committed to upholding individual rights, thereby protecting the 
“delicate balance” described by the Pitfield/ Buckwold Senate Committee, which 
conducted the first major evaluation of Canada’s security and intelligence services.  
  The thesis will argue that, contrary to the assertions of analysts such as Leishman 
and Petter, the principle of legislative supremacy continues to define the Canadian 
political process in regard to security intelligence review. It demonstrates how the SCC 
and SIRC have been able to uphold the rights of Canadians while respecting the authority 
of Parliament and the cabinet. Furthermore, it shows that these bodies have all striven to 
reach institutional accommodation in the ongoing process of defining the parameters of 
legal and moral acceptability of the actions of CSIS, as interpreted from the standpoint of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the CSIS Act and other relevant legislation. These 
findings are supported by my examination of the decisions and actions of the SCC and 
SIRC in specific case studies, notably Canada v. Khadr, United States v. Burns, and  
Charkaoui v. Canada, and the SIRC reports on Omar Khadr, Mohammed Mansour 
Jabarah and The Heritage Front Affair.   
 
1.3  Methodology 
 Utilizing dialogue theory as an analytical framework, this paper will undertake an 
analysis of decisions by the SCC and of SIRC Annual Reports related to the activities of 
CSIS, in order to determine the extent to which the courts and SIRC have demonstrated 
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respect for parliamentary supremacy, consideration for the security interests of the state, 
and restraint in attempting to influence policy outcomes. The analysis of SCC decisions 
and SIRC reports will be informed and supported by a plethora of prominent authors and 
secondary sources. It must be noted that the documents and literature dealing with the 
SCC’s review function of security intelligence in Canada are more plentiful than those 
dealing with SIRC’s functions, whose decisions and action remain, for security reasons, 
still, to a large extent, in the shadows. With respect to SIRC’s activities, the thesis will 
thus be forced to focus mostly, with the exception of some prominent secondary sources, 
on the agency’s reports, whose analysis is not always transparent. This will be one of the 
main challenges of the thesis research.  
 
1.4  Organization of Thesis 
 This introductory chapter has provided an explanation of the historical 
antecedents that led up to the two important reform initiatives (the CSIS Act and the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) undertaken by the Trudeau government, which served 
to establish the external review system for the security and intelligence activities of the 
federal government. The chapter also introduced the debate between those who view 
these reforms as having brought about the demise of legislative supremacy in Canada and 
those who believe they have served to establish an effective review system. The chapter 
also outlined the purpose of this study and its methodological approach to exploring 
judicial review, and to measuring the dialogue that takes place between judicial bodies 
and the elected branches of government. Measurement will be achieved through a 
qualitative analysis of selected SCC decisions and SIRC Reports. 
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 The second chapter introduces dialogue theory, which maintains that several 
different forms of dialogue can take place between judicial bodies and the 
executive/legislative branches, while giving the executive/legislative branches the final 
say on matters related to government policy. It is proposed that a declarative dialogue 
takes place when the SCC and SIRC issue pronouncements and Parliament and/or the 
government responds.  
 The third chapter focuses on the role of the SCC as a review mechanism for the 
activities of CSIS. Its premise is that the Charter did not mark the advent of judicial 
supremacy. The fear that some analysts have of judicial supremacy arises out of their 
concern about the breadth of interpretation that courts may give to Section 7 of the 
Charter, which pertains to life, liberty and security of the person. However, the chapter 
demonstrates, courts have taken a considerate, cautious and tempered approach in their 
interpretation of the Charter in regard to national security intelligence. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of judicial decisions in the following cases: Canada v. Khadr; 
United States v. Burns; Charkaoui v. Canada. With the (arguable) exception of Burns, 
the thesis shows that the SCC demonstrated considerable respect for the interests of the 
state by ensuring that the government had the final say in dealing with these security 
intelligence issues.   
 The fourth chapter provides an examination of the body that is directly 
responsible for reviewing and providing oversight of the activities of CSIS – SIRC. The 
chapter begins by exploring the genesis of SIRC and then defines its mandate and 
functions. Attention is given to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the intelligence review 
  14 
performed by the Committee. A significant part of the chapter examines the inherent 
difficulty facing SIRC in providing review and oversight of an intelligence agency that is 
supposed to be operating in secrecy. It explains how SIRC has been able to meet this 
challenge and achieve institutional accommodation with CSIS and Parliament and the 
cabinet. Finally, the chapter undertakes an analysis of selected SIRC reviews, including 
Omar Khadr, the Heritage Front Affair, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. The thesis shows 
that SIRC has demonstrated considerable respect for the authority of Parliament and the 
cabinet, while effectively exerting its review powers. In instances in which SIRC nullifies 
a particular activity undertaken by CSIS, SIRC has continuously sought to rectify the 
impropriety by addressing CSIS’s internal procedural policies, rather than challenging the 
sufficiency of the overarching legislative framework that governs CSIS activities.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Perspectives  
The acceptable relationship between judicial bodies and the other branches of 
government when interpreting the Constitution has long been a matter of debate. Efforts  
to depict the normative and descriptive principles governing the relationship between 
judicial bodies and the other branches of government have proceeded from two 
theoretical perspectives. These two theories can be placed on a continuum. At one end of 
the continuum lies the theory of judicial supremacy described by Leishman, Petter and 
others –– where the Constitution is defined by what they courts say it is; the courts are 
seen as the sole legitimate entity in the matter of constitutional interpretation. At the other 
end, lies the theory of parliamentary supremacy, where legislatures can implement and 
repeal legislation as they see fit, irrespective of the dictates of the judicial branch.  
 
2.1 Dialogue Theory 
 Dialogue theory serves to reconcile these contending views by its claim that 
neither the judiciary nor the legislature is supreme in the realm of law-making; rather 
each influences the other in turn. Proposed by Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell in 
1997, dialogue theory identifies “degrees of dialogue” or venues in which the SCC and 
the cabinet/Parliament can engage each other in the process of interpreting the 
Constitution and formulating policies. It acknowledges that the courts have “a wide scope 
for intervention [and interpretation on constitutional matters, but it denies finality or]… 
supremacy to their pronouncements” (pp. 3-6).   
  16 
 Justice Frank Iacobucci played a crucial role in introducing, legitimating and 
operationalizing the “metaphor of judicial review as a form of dialogue” in Canadian 
constitutional democracy (Roach, 2007a; 449).  
  Dialogue theory contends that legislatures serve to legitimize the explicit and 
implicit normative values articulated through judicial decision-making (Petter, 2003). 
Adherents of this view conclude that Charter decisions are inconclusive, and form part of 
an important dialogue with legislatures “…in which the latter retain the final say” (Hogg 
et al., 1997). It is the legislature that will determine how to deal with the outcomes of 
Charter-decisions that legitimates Charter decision-making by the judiciary. Hogg and 
Bushell contend that judicial decisions that strike down laws (or executive actions)iv on 
Charter grounds almost always leave room “for the law to be re-enacted by the 
competent legislative body in a form that still accomplish[es] the objectives of the invalid 
law…[and furthermore] most judicial decisions striking down laws have been followed 
by legislative sequels” (Ibid.)., as was the case in Khadr v. Canada, and Charkaoui v. 
Canada. Described in other terms, “judicially-imposed constitutional norms rarely defeat 
a desired legislative policy [but rather] they generally operate at the margins of legislative 
policy, affecting issues of process, enforcement of standards, all which can accommodate 
more legislative objectives” (Ibid.). This is what we see in the decisions and reports of 
the SCC and SIRC respectively, which will be examined in the thesis.  
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2.1.1 Dialogue Between Judicial Bodies and Executive/Legislative Branches 
 Hogg and Bushel identify six potential degrees or models of dialogue between the 
SCC and executive/legislative branches. In the first model, legislatures may invoke 
Section 33 (notwithstanding) of the Charter in a specific case, to take exception to a 
judicially defined right, or uphold a statute notwithstanding the court’s decision. 
However, John Whyte notes, the use of Section 33 has only been invoked on a few 
occasions since 1982 (2007). 
 Secondly, Section 1 of the Charter provides room for a direct dialogue between 
the courts and the government, as the latter must demonstrate to the courts that its 
limitation of the judicially defined right is ‘reasonable’. However, this form of dialogue 
has yet to take place on matters related to CSIS –- likely because there would be a high 
political cost for any government to abridge such judicially defined rights. Furthermore, 
when intelligence matters come before the courts, the activities in question have 
generally been completed and therefore individuals may see little benefit in making such 
a challenge.  
 A third model of dialogue is found when “some rights are internally qualified and 
therefore do not constitute an absolute prohibition on certain actions” (Manfredi, 1999). 
These include Sections 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the Charter, which facilitate dialogue by 
allowing government to limit these rights in a demonstrably fair and necessary manner.     
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Fourthly, the Charter allows for a wide variance of remedial measures that may 
fall short of overturning a legislative measure (Ibid.) Even where legislation it overturned 
by the SCC, it will leave room for a wide variety of potential remedial measures to be 
drafted and implemented by Parliament. Kent Roach, Professor of Law at the University 
of Toronto and renowned constitutional expert, concurs with Hogg and Bushel “that the 
crafting of constitutional remedies is an important site of dialogue between courts and 
legislatures” (2007; 176). At the remedial stage, courts have demonstrated significant 
deference to allow Parliament or the executive to exercise its will.  
One “instrument of remedial dialogue…[has been the] widespread use of 
the…[suspended] declaration of invalidity (Roach, 2001; 200). “Suspended declarations 
of invalidity are also a valuable instrument of dialogue because they give the legislature 
an opportunity to expand the terms of debate and enact more comprehensive and creative 
remedies” (Roach, 2007; 176). In this dialogue, it is the responsibility of the SCC to 
remind Parliament of “values that might otherwise be neglected” (Roach, 2001; 250), and 
the responsibility of Parliament to refine the debate by clarifying why certain rights must 
be “limited in particular contexts” (Ibid.).  
Fifth, judicial review encourages what Hogg and Bushell call “Charter-speak”, 
where in drafting new legislation or in response to a judicial decision, legislatures 
“increasingly incorporate the language of Charter review” into statutes.   
Finally, a sixth type of dialogue may occur when legislation is upheld but flaws 
are identified in the relevant statute or code (Hogg et al., 1997).  
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Although the six types of dialogue identified by Hogg and Bushell are evident in 
varying degrees in the SIRC reports and SCC decisions examined in this thesis, they are 
all necessary to understand the nature of interactions between the courts and SIRC on the 
one hand, and Parliament and cabinet on the other.  
As discussed, neither Section 33 nor Section 1 has been invoked as justifications 
to override judicial decisions or limit rights in any security intelligence cases. However, 
these two Sections still perform an important symbolic role –– affirming the authority of 
Parliament and cabinet vis-à-vis judicial and quasi-judicial review bodies.  
The concept of ‘qualified rights’ under Sections 7, 8, 9 and 12 (the third type of 
dialogue) also serves as an important symbolic reminder of the fact that, under certain 
circumstances, some rights are not absolute or inalienable. Furthermore, balance is a 
necessary element of securing human rights. The pressure to balance individual rights 
against state interests is particularly high in cases that involve matters of national 
security. 
The case studies examined in this thesis also demonstrate that multiple forms of 
dialogue can take place in a single decision or report.  This was the case in Charkaoui v. 
Canada, in which both the fourth and sixth types of dialogue were used by the SCC, 
which focused on procedural aspects of security certificate legislation rather than striking 
down the entire bill, and suspended its decision for one year.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Supreme Court and Security Intelligence Cases 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Since the inception of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, its impact on the 
Canadian polity has been debated extensively. One of the most prominent debates relates 
to the perceived growth of the judiciary’s influence in areas of public policy. Some of the 
important questions that are addressed by this debate are: how has the Charter affected 
the balance of power between the elected (legislature and executive) and the unelected 
(judiciary) branches of government? Can unelected judges be trusted to act objectively 
and weigh complex social, political and legal considerations in interpreting the Charter?  
Has the Charter in fact brought about the advent of judicial supremacy, where any kind 
of legislative response to judicial decisions is effectively precluded, or do the courts still 
respect the principle of parliamentary supremacy?  
 This chapter examines how the Charter has affected the role and authority of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis Parliament and the cabinet. It examines selected decisions by the SCC 
in Charter cases involving the activities of CSIS. The sensitivities and principles of 
fundamental justice that are at stake in Charter challenges related to the security 
intelligence activities of the federal government make this a particularly valuable area of 
study. 
 The selected cases include: Canada (Justice) v. Khadr; R v. Hape; and Charkaoui 
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Leishman, 2006; Plaxton et al., 2011; Austen, 
2010; Hudson, 2010; Freeze, 2009; Roach, 2008).   
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 The first part of the chapter will examine the merits of Petter and Leishman’s 
claims that the Charter has brought, or may bring, about the advent of judicial 
supremacy.  This section will provide a brief overview of the constitutional negotiations 
that led to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the types of concerns some Premiers, and other public officials, had 
with the prospect of entrenching the Charter in the Constitution. For these leaders there 
were two main issues: the desirability of an increased role for the judiciary in public 
affairs; and the capacity of unelected officials to adequately meet such an important 
mandate.  We will see the potential effects of the Charter on the power of the judicial 
bodies to affect public policies, but as well the limits of such power posed by Section 1 
(reasonable limits clause) and Section 33 (notwithstanding clause) of the Constitution Act 
1982. 
 The second part of the chapter will cite the criticisms by the authors of 
Canada…Notwithstanding (1984) of the increased power given to the courts in the 
Charter era, and also their characterization of the limited capacity of the courts to 
appreciate and consider the myriad of socio-political and legal considerations involved in 
the drafting of legislation.   
 The third part of the chapter will provide an empirical analysis of three selected 
judicial decisions related to the activities of CSIS. The objective is to determine whether 
the SCC has respected Parliament’s authority to make laws, or instead sought to provide 
stringent remedial measures, thereby precluding the possibility of a legislative response. 
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The chapter will also seek to determine whether the SCC has recognized cabinet’s 
constitutional authority over foreign affairs, while remaining committed to upholding 
individual rights.   
 
3.2 The Demise of Legislative Supremacy?  
 3.2.1 Constitutional Negotiations 
 The Charter became a central focus of the proposed constitutional change in 1981 
both for the public and the first ministers for two main reasons. First, the Charter was the 
singular aspect of constitutional reform that gave individuals direct protection in relation 
“…to some public decisions affecting their lives” (Romanow et al., 1984: 218).  
Furthermore, “a charter of rights deals in values which are rooted in the claims of 
individuals, as opposed to the needs and interests of governments and bureaucracies” 
(Ibid.). In 1982 the Constitution was amended to include a clause stating that the 
Constitution, including the Charter, “is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
of no force and effect” (Constitution Act. s. 52(1), 1982). Individuals are also expressly 
given the right, under s. 24(1) of the Charter, “to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”  
 Thus, depending on its interpretation, the Charter can significantly increase the 
law-making power of the judiciary, by allowing courts to rule on the legality of 
government policy.  In cases where statutes or other policy instruments are overturned, or 
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deemed to be in contravention of the Charter, courts may affect or dictate policy 
outcomes by prescribing remedial measures. Accordingly, the text of the Constitution 
reflects the conscious political choice to grant judges extensive power to pass judgment 
on decisions by the democratically-elected representatives (Sharpe et al., 2002).   
 The Charter became a central issue during the constitutional negotiations 
because, despite its seemingly progressive nature, most of the provincial Premiers 
vehemently opposed it (Ibid.). The Premiers’ opposition was based on the ascendant view 
within the “gang of eight”,v that political judgment was inherently superior to judicial 
judgment “in accommodating competing interests…including…[those in] rights claims” 
(Whyte, 2007: 82). With the advent of judicial review came concerns regarding judicial 
activism, or courts imposing their will on legislatures –– because “judges are not 
accountable to electors for the choices they make and electors would have no opportunity 
to express their approval or disapproval of these outcomes” (Whyte, 2007: 83).  
 Provincial opposition was based not only on protecting provincial interests but 
also on “a set of political ideas, drawn from Canada’s history” (Sharpe et al., 2002: 5). 
Opponents of the Charter continue to maintain that judicial activism will lead to the 
demise of parliamentary sovereignty, which has been “the central feature of [Canadian 
and] British political culture” (Bastien, 2010). Lord Diplock argued that elected 
parliamentarians were best suited to make decisions related to socio-economic policy, 
and therefore it was a mistake to entrench the Charter in the Constitution, because it 
would inevitably bring judges into the political arena and compel them to make political 
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decisions (Ibid.). The Premiers, though not necessarily in concert, were all concerned 
about the effects of court decisions on government policy. 
 3.2.2 Effects of the Charter  
 The Charter has had a profound impact upon the role of the judiciary in Canada. 
The courts are now empowered to deal with issues that range far beyond what was seen 
as appropriate within the scope of the judicial function before 1982. Prior to 1982, 
Canadians viewed the SCC as a remote institution that had little, if any, real impact upon 
their lives; this was because SCC cases dealt mostly with disputes over Sections 91 and 
92 (federal and provincial legislative powers) of the Constitution Act, 1867.  The SCC 
still hears cases around the division of legislative powers, but with an entrenched Charter 
it now spends much of its time deciding issues related to individual rights –– which can 
affect public policy both federally and provincially. In particular, as discussed below, the 
concerns articulated by Petter and Romanow and his co-authors, as well as others, are 
grounded in the view that Section 7 (protecting the right to “life, liberty and security of 
the person’) allows the courts to have inordinate influence in an increasing number of 
areas of social policy. 
 Since entrenchment of the Charter, the SCC has undeniably become an institution 
to which citizens increasingly turn for protection of their fundamental freedoms and 
rights (Ibid.). Charter litigation has become an important tool used by interest groups to 
advance their political goals. The courts thus play a central role in defining what are the 
most important social and political issues of the day (Sharpe et al., 2002).  
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On the basis of these developments, some analysts such as former Attorney 
General of British Columbia Andrew Petter, argue that the introduction of the Charter 
marked the “demise of legislative supremacy in Canada” (2009: 150). Those who 
supported the Charter did so “to provide courts with a constitutional mandate to 
invalidate legislative and governmental actions that were inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms it guaranteed” (Ibid.). By virtue of this change, Petter 
proposes, the convention of Crown supremacy was replaced with constitutional 
supremacy (Ibid.).  
 Prior to the Charter, states Leishman, “Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
[had absolute power in drafting, implementing and revoking legislation] within their 
respective spheres of…jurisdiction” (Leishman, 2006: 3) under Sections 91 and 92 of the 
British North America Act, 1867. In the Charter era, the SCC has come to have supreme 
control over judicial and legislative processes, as unelected judges are able to issue 
directives to the democratically-elected representatives of the people of Canada (Ibid.). 
 This thesis proceeds from the opposite argument that the framers of the Charter 
did not necessarily grant the last word to the courts. The court cases that it examines 
related to national security intelligence provide evidence, contrary to the findings of 
Petter and Leishman, that courts, in interpreting the Charter, have continued to respect 
the authority of Parliament.  
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3.2.3 Sections 1 and 33 of the Charter 
 There are two sections of the Charter that have been pertinent to court cases 
having to do with security intelligence in Canada –- Section 33 and Section 1. Both 
Sections permit the legislating authority to act so as to override decisions made by the 
courts – to protect the greater public good or the larger interests of the state. As Alan 
Blakeney has said: “the decision…of the Charter was made knowing that…rights would 
be best enforced by the legislative, executive and administrative arms of government. 
Section 33…was included in the Charter to ensure that the state could…override a 
Charter-protected right” (2010: 1). Legislatures retain the ability under Section 33 to 
enact laws, notwithstanding their violation of fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and 
equality rights, for a renewable five-year period. The existence of the notwithstanding 
clause in the Charter effectively means that court decisions striking down laws can be 
reversed in the appropriate legislature (Hogg, 2008: 730). Section 33 states: “Parliament 
or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the 
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or section 7 to 15 of the Charter” 
(Ibid.).  
 Section 1, which contains the Charter’s “reasonable limitation clause” has a 
similar effect, by enabling the government to limit Charter rights by upholding 
legislation that might be viewed as contravening the Charter. Legislatures can enact laws 
and justify them to the courts under Section 1 of the Charter as “reasonable limits 
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prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” 
(Ibid.).    
 A review of the jurisprudence in the Charter-era reveals that judges of the SCC 
while attuned to the inherent worth and rights of the individual, are also able to make 
complex decisions that weigh these rights against the collective interests of the state. We 
will see below that this consideration was particularly evident in the case of Khadr, in 
which the Court upheld Khadr’s Charter rights, while not forcing the Canadian 
Government to request Khadr’s repatriation to Canada, thereby respecting Parliament’s 
authority to make law and executive authority over the conduct of foreign relations.  
Judges, like other public servants, are compelled by the call of duty to do what is 
right for the state. The thesis argues that the concerns about judges seeking to assert their 
personal views in cases affecting policy outcomes, to the detriment of democratic values, 
(Petter, 2003) are overstated.  Judges are in fact properly charged with the task of 
defining constitutional norms and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms in a 
modern liberal democracy. Furthermore, the Canadian experience to date suggests that 
judges, in interpreting the Charter, have acted so as to enhance rather than detract from 
fundamental democratic values (Sharpe et al., 1991: 3).     
 
3.3  Case Studies 
 This section will examine Supreme Court decisions in Charter-cases related to the 
activities of CSIS. It will demonstrate that the courts have demonstrated a respect for 
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Parliament’s authority to make laws, and cabinet’s authority over foreign affairs –– by 
exhibiting restraint in the exercise of remedial discretion, often allowing room for a 
legislative response to their decisions that creates a dialogue with elected legislators 
(Hogg and Bushel, 1997).  
 In the twenty-two years period following the enactment of the Bill of Rights 
(1960), the Supreme Court overturned only one piece of legislation as incompatible with 
that statute. Judicial experts expected that the courts would “exercise similar restraint in 
interpreting the similar provisions of the Charter” (Leishman, 2006: vii). However, 
analysts such as Ian Hopper remained skeptical and contended that “the courts would 
break prior restraint and interpret the Charter as a license to routinely strike down and 
amend statutes duly enacted by Parliament…” (Ibid.). The three court cases examined 
below, relating to the activities of CSIS, demonstrate that Hopper’s predictions regarding 
judicial activism have not materialized. 
 3.3.1 Canada v. Khadr 
 In 2009-2010 the SCC rendered a high volume of Charter rulings (Plaxton et al., 
2011). One of the most high profile of these rulings was the Khadr v. Canada (Prime 
Minister) case. This case clearly demonstrates the power struggle between the judiciary 
and elected law-makers. Those who had criticized the Harper Government’s disregard for 
constitutional principles hoped that the Khadr No.3vi decision would be a victory for the 
judiciary’s ability to check executive powers (Slayton, 2010). There was also speculation 
that the case would be a harbinger of the coming conflict between Prime Minister 
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Stephen Harper and Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin (Ibid.).  
 Seized by US forces in Afghanistan in 2002 and detained in Guantanamo Bay 
following a fatal firefight, Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, became the subject of 
international media attention as he was the only child soldier to be detained at 
Guantanamo. Beginning in March 2005, Khadr sought repatriation to Canada, but Prime 
Minister Harper refused to make such a request of the US government (Ibid. 53). Khadr 
sought judicial review of this decision in August 2008. Although the Canadian 
government had been previously ordered by the Federal Court to repatriate Khadr 
(Khadr. No. 1),vii a decision that was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal (Khadr No. 
2),viii government lawyers and other senior officials in Ottawa maintained that it was not 
the responsibility of the courts to interfere with the conduct of Canada’s foreign relations. 
Based on this reasoning, the Harper government refused to acquiesce to the mounting 
public pressure for Khadr’s return (Austen, 2010: 7). The government’s position on 
Khadr was informed by the Regina. v. Hape case, which found that the Charter does not 
apply to the action of Canadian officials in foreign territory (2007).  However, Khadr’s 
lawyers argued that DFAIT and CSIS agents had violated Khadr’s international human 
rights and therefore the Charter, from which the applicable international rights codes had 
drawn much of their language, had been violated by CSIS agents who interviewed him at 
Guantanamo. It was hoped by many analysts that the SCC would uphold the lower 
court’s decision to request Khadr’s repatriation (Plaxton et al., 2011: 55).  
 The SCC considered whether Khadr’s Section 7 rights, guaranteeing the right to 
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“be free from deprivations of life, liberty, and security of the person in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice” had been violated (Plaxton et al., 2011). Noting 
that the information obtained by Canadian officials was passed to US officials, and that 
this information could be used in the military proceedings against Khadr, the SCC found 
reason to believe that government action constituted “the deprivation of liberty and 
security of the person”. This deprivation was found to be in contravention of the 
principles of fundamental justice.  
 After “briefly reviewing” (Khadr No. 3: supra note at para 18) the conduct of 
CSIS and DFAIT agents in (Khadr No. 3), the Supreme Court said the following (Ibid.: 
para 25): 
 
“this conduct established Canadian participation in state conduct that violated the 
principles of fundamental justice. Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements 
about the most serious criminal charges while detained in these conditions and 
without access to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of the interrogations 
would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian 
standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.”  
 
 Furthermore, the SCC found that this abridgement of Khadr’s rights was ongoing, 
since Khadr continued to be stripped of his liberty in part due to the information provided 
by officials of CSIS and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Para 
30). The final task for the SCC would be to determine whether a government request for 
repatriation was the appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.  
 Employing the language of Doucet-Boudreau, the SCC held that such an order 
could be the appropriate remedy to “meaningfully vindicate the rights [of Omar Khadr]” 
(Khadr para 28; Doucet s 62 at para 55). It found that remedial measures were necessary 
in Khadr’s case. (Plaxton et al., 54). Yet it cited Doucet-Boudreau in requiring that 
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remedial measures “…employ means that are legitimate within the framework of 
[Canada’s] constitutional democracy” (Khadr para 33; Boudreau para 56). An order to 
request repatriation, it declared, would offend against the constitutional authority of the 
cabinet over foreign affairs (Khadr [No. 2], para 33) “in the context of complex and ever-
changing circumstances, taking into account Canada broader national interests” (Ibid., 
para 37).  
 Thus, the Court did not challenge the federal government’s refusal to request 
Khadr’s return (Austen, 2010). It maintained that it had limited purview over the 
considerations of government in deciding whether to request Khadr’s repatriation, 
especially given the fact that developments in his legal case were ongoing (Plaxton et al, 
55). The SCC declared that Khadr’s Section 7 rights had been violated, but it did not 
demand a repatriation order, leaving the decision as to how to proceed on the matter up to 
the cabinet.  
 According to the SCC, Khadr’s rights under both Canadian and international law 
had been violated as a result of the interview conducted by DFAIT and CSIS agents with 
Khadr, while he was detained at Guantanamo. Because Khadr was a minor at the time of 
the interview with no access to counsel, and given the widespread media coverage of the 
human rights abuses at Guantanamo, Canadian officials had behaved illegally. But the 
SCC did not require, as a remedial measure, that the federal Government request Khadr’s 
repatriation. This decision would be heavily criticized by academics such as Kent Roach 
(2007), who questioned whether a simple declaration of unconstitutionality was a 
sufficient and responsible remedial measure.  
 The SCC’s decision did not require a response from the government, but one 
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quickly emerged. Within one week, the Canadian government released a statement 
reaffirming its commitment to leave Khadr’s future in the hands of the US legal system. 
It would not request repatriation unless it was forced to do so. 
 Since that time, Khadr has pleaded guilty to killing Army Sgt. 1st Class 
Christopher Speer, as part of a plea bargain, the details of which have yet to be released 
(Fox, 2010). The SCC’s ruling that Khadr’s Section 7 rights were violated has raised the 
ire of some critics who contend that the Canadian government should have reacted 
differently and at least requested that information obtained by DFAIT agents not be used 
in Khadr’s criminal prosecution (Ibid. 57). This remedy would be seen as “less intrusive 
than a request for repatriation” (Ibid.) The SCC did not seek such a remedy, but the 
federal government did request through diplomatic channels in February 2010 that 
evidence provided by DFAIT agents to US officials not be used in Khadr’s trial. 
However, in July of that year the Federal Court ruled that even this request was 
insufficient in light of the extent of Khadr’s mistreatment, and it requested a more 
“acceptable remedial strategy within the week” (Ibid., 58). But the Harper government 
has appealed this decision on the basis that it infringes on cabinet’s “prerogative over 
foreign affairs” (Ibid.)  
 According to a diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, former CSIS Director Jim 
Judd derided the Federal Court’s decision in Khadr No. 1, as it “posit[s] that Canadian 
authorities cannot use information that may have been derived from torture, and that any 
Canadians public official who conveys such information may be subject to criminal 
prosecution” (CBC News, 2010). He went on to credit the Harper government for “taking 
it on the chin and pressing ahead with common sense measures despite court challenges 
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and political knocks from opposition parties and interest groups.” (Ibid.)  
 3.3.2 United States v. Burns 
 The case of Burns, focused on Glen Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay, two 
Canadian citizens accused of murdering Rafay’s family by the Bellevue Police 
Department in Washington. After having returned to Canada, Rafay and Burns confessed 
their crime to an undercover RCMP officer, who was working as part of a targeted sting 
operation called Mr. Big (Mulgrew, 2011). Rafay and Burns maintained that their 
confessions had been falsified. Nonetheless, plans were set in motion to have them 
returned to the US to face prosecution. 
Here the SCC did involve itself in Canadian foreign and security policy matters, 
by asserting that the circumstances are limited under which cabinet can agree to 
extradition. Moreover, cabinet must seek reassurances from the requesting state that the 
individual in question will not be threatened by the death penalty regardless of the effect 
on Canada’s foreign relations (Burns). This seemed to contradict the Court’s ruling in 
Khadr, but the Court explained that in the case of Burns the context required a more 
effective remedy due to the fact that the individual was in Canadian custody and the 
ability to protect against a Charter breach “was entirely within Canada’s power” (Khadr 
No. 3: para [42]). In the Khadr case, the Court noted that “no public purpose would be 
served by [Khadr’s] extradition” (Plaxton et al., 56). Moreover, “Mr. Khadr [was] not 
under the control of the Canadian government…[and]… the impact on Canadian foreign 
relations of a repatriation request [could not] be properly assessed by the Court” (Khadr 
No. 2: para 42). By contrast, in the Burns case the Court recommended that the 
government repatriate Burns, regardless of the potential diplomatic problems that could 
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accrue from opposing our US ally (Ibid., 55). This reflected a much greater willingness 
on the part of the SCC to venture into foreign policy decision-making than in Khadr. And 
it also limited the scope of potential responses that could have been considered by 
Ministers or debated in Parliament. 
 3.3.3 Charkaoui v. Canada 
 Since the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, the Canadian government has 
adopted a wide range of policies designed to deal with the emerging threat of 
transnational terrorist activity. The implementation of these policies has been achieved 
largely through changes to immigration law, which lowered evidentiary standards of 
proof in deportation hearings to the same level as criminal ones (Hudson, 2010: 129). 
This makes it easier for officials to remove non-citizens, whom they consider to pose a 
threat to Canadian national security; the presiding judge now may exercise greater 
discretion regarding what constitutes reasonable grounds to remove non-citizens. Since 
1976, security certificate legislation has thus permitted the government to investigate, 
compile and retain information on non-citizens in Canada suspected of posing a risk to 
national security (Ibid.). If such methods are found to be reasonable by the presiding 
judge, the named persons will now be deported and may be denied the protection of 
criminal law principles such as the right of appeal (Ibid.).  
 Charakoui v Canada (No. 1 and No. 2), were landmark decisions by the SCC 
redefining procedures for assessing the credibility of security certificates and detention 
under their provisions. The issue in Charakoui No. 1ix was that the federal government 
had been unwilling to follow the order of a Federal Court judge to disclose all 
information that could be safely released, relevant to Mr. Charkaoui, (Ibid., 130).  The 
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Court found that there was so little left on file after the government redacted the 
information it considered sensitive that the security certificate was rendered 
unsupportable (Ibid.).  
 Although the courts initially demonstrated a reluctance to challenge certificate 
legislation, substantial changes have taken place over time. In Charkaoui No. 2,x the SCC 
decided that criminal proceedings and certificate proceedings are comparable and 
therefore persons named in security certificates have a constitutional right to a fair 
hearing (Mugerwa, 2008). It struck down “key provisions of security certificates as 
grossly unfair” (Freeze, 2009: 2), and a violation of habeas corpus under Sections 7, 9 
and 10 of the Charter.  
 The SCC ruled that the inability of Charkaoui to know and challenge the secret 
information being used to support his detention and deportation violated his Section 7 
right to fundamental justice, a right extended to everyone in Canada including non-
citizens. It also ruled that the limitation of this right could not be justified under Section 1 
as there were other measures that could have been implemented, such as the British 
special advocate system, which would abridge Charkaoui’s rights to a lesser extent. The 
SCC also ruled that government must store and reveal to judges and special advocatesxi 
all information on file that is relevant to named persons (Ibid.). The SCC gave Parliament 
one year to improve the system, by suspending its ruling for that period.  
 Charkaoui v. Canada, exemplifies the struggle (or dialogue) between Parliament, 
the executive and the judiciary in balancing human rights and national security interests 
in certificate proceedings. Ultimately, the Court adopted a position that reflected legal 
pragmatism, focusing to a large extent on the context of the case. Courts have agreed to 
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allow security certificates, and they have allowed government to exercise its discretion in 
determining what information can and cannot be made public. Such decisions have 
served to refine and improve the statutory regime governing certificate proceedings, 
without undermining their effectiveness.  
Supporting the theory that “the Charter promotes dialogue between courts and   
legislatures as an alternative to the theory of either judicial or… [parliamentary] 
supremacy” (Roach, 2008: 282), in Charkaoui, the SCC allowed room for Parliament to 
determine the degree to which and means by which complainants may challenge security 
certificates. The SCC suggested several prospective remedial alternatives that would limit 
rights to an acceptable degree, and suspended its declaration of invalidity for 12 months, 
effectively allowing the law to remain in effect temporarily to allow time for Parliament 
to implement an appropriate legislative response (Roach, 2008).  
  By declining to rule that the legislative provisions governing the certificate 
system were unconstitutional, the SCC found a balance between protecting the rights of 
citizens while respecting the security interests of the state (Hudson 2010, 130).  
            It is worth noting that the prospective remedial measures provided by the SCC, 
and the unintended results of their application, highlight some of the potential hazards 
that exist when courts seek to provide such measures in instances that affect government 
policy. Many took the SCC’s mention of the special advocate system used in Britain as 
an endorsement of that system, despite the fact that the SCC merely mentioned it as a 
possible alternative to the security certificate system in Canada, and explicitly recognized 
that it was “problematic in a number of respects” (Roach, 2008).  
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The powers held by judiciaries to provide remedy on legal matters that affect 
policy outcomes have been used wisely. However, it is possible that in the future the SCC 
may be less cautious and more activist in its prescription of remedial measures on matters 
that affect government policy.xii  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has given a special role to the 
courts to protect “the powerless against the breach of these rights and freedoms by the 
legislative and executive arms of government” (Blakeney, 2010: 4). While the three cases 
analyzed in this section demonstrate that the SCC, in hearing Charter cases related to 
Canada’s security intelligence activities, has undoubtedly taken on this role, it has been 
careful in such cases to balance individual rights against the collective interests of the 
state.   
The Khadr case involved actions of CSIS officials abroad resulting in the ill-
treatment of a Canadian citizen. In its decision, the SCC did not challenge the Canadian 
government’s refusal to repatriate Khadr, despite the fact that his Charter rights had been 
violated. This demonstrated significant restraint in the use of remedial powers under 
Section 24, and respect for Cabinet’s authority over foreign affairs. 
 In the Burns case, like Khadr, the issue was the operation of CSIS abroad 
involving a Canadian citizen. In this decision, the SCC employed its remedial power, by 
demanding the government request Burn’s repatriation, regardless of the potential 
diplomatic problems that could accrue from opposing the United States (Plaxton et al., 
55). It declared that Parliament possessed the authority and legal responsibility to ensure 
  38 
that Burns was not held indefinitely, as a result of information provided illegally by 
Canadian officials. Some might contend that his decision was a contradiction of the 
SCC’s decision in Khadr  v. Canada, in which it did not demand Khadr’s repatriation 
based on the violations committed by CSIS. But from another perspective, this decision  
could be taken to mean that the courts will not interpret laws in a strict and authoritative 
manner unless Parliament “has made its intent to violate rights crystal clear” (Roach, 
2001; 247). This presumption allows the courts to engage other government institutions 
in a dialogue concerning the legal and moral parameters governing CSIS’s operations.  
Another explanation is simply that in a dialogic model, the SCC must be “true to 
its anti-majoritarian nature… Strong and principled interventions in the 
dialogue…[ensure that unpopular values] that would not ordinarily be heard” are given 
consideration (Ibid., 245) . In the case of Charkaoui, the SCC ruled that the current 
system of security certificates was unconstitutional, as it violated the complainant’s 
Section 7 right to know and his right to defend himself against information being used in 
his prosecution. However, by focusing on procedural aspects of the security certificate 
legislation, rather than striking down the entire bill, the SCC’s ruling did not result in a 
complete overhaul of the statutory regime governing security certificates. Furthermore, 
the SCC suspended its declaration of invalidity for one year, to give Parliament time to 
respond to the decision. This decision exemplifies the fourth type of dialogue identified 
by Hogg and Bushell, namely suspended declarations of invalidity as a form of remedial 
dialogue. 
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According to a 2008 U.S. diplomatic cabled published by Wikileaks, former CSIS 
Director Jim Judd has said that the current system of intelligence review in Canada has 
“‘CSIS in knots,’ making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent terror attacks in 
Canada and abroad.” (CBC News, 2010). According to Judd, the review system has 
“…left government security agencies on the defensive and losing public support for their 
effort to protect Canada and its allies” (Ibid.). However, the jurisprudence examined in 
this chapter demonstrates that this is not the case. The decisions by the SCC on security 
intelligence cases have recognized that a balance must be struck between collective 
interests and individual rights, amounting to a practice of legal pragmatism.  
 Admittedly, the SCC’s position with respect to proposing remedial measures has 
not always been consistent. But rather than being driven by ideology, or allowing strict 
jurisprudence to determine the outcomes of cases, the SCC has demonstrated an ability to 
make pragmatic and dynamic decisions based on the evidence presented and information 
available, as well as the socio-political context in which such evidence is presented. This 
was observable in the Burns and Khadr decisions: in the Burns case the SCC remedied a 
request for repatriation for a Charter breach, while in the Khadr case it chose not to do 
this. Thus the SCC demonstrated its capacity to make sound legal decisions while taking 
into account political considerations and social and economic implications.  
This finding represents an important answer to those who assert the Charter has 
brought, or will bring, about an era of judicial activism. Although, the SCC has a mixed 
record with respect to its utilization of stringent remedial measures in cases that affect 
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national intelligence policy, it is clear that the fears articulated by Leishman (2006), and 
Petter (2009), with respect to the advent of judicial supremacy, have not yet been 
realized.   
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Chapter 4  
The Security Intelligence Review Committee 
4.1 Introduction 
 There is little consensus among academics and security intelligence professionals 
regarding the degree to which SIRC has demonstrated a capacity to effectively exert its 
powers of review of the activities of CSIS. For example, a former Solicitor General told 
the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence that Canada possesses a 
review and oversight system that other countries want to emulate (Farson, 2000: 225). 
Similarly, intelligence officials reported to the Senate Committee that no parliamentary 
committee in the world has close to the access that SIRC has to CSIS, with respect to 
domestic intelligence activities (Ibid.). Based on these testimonials, Canada’s principal 
security intelligence review body may, in many respects, be regarded as the hallmark of 
security intelligence review bodies in the 21st century, and a model by which other states 
may implement oversight and accountability mechanisms for their own security 
intelligence activities.  
 Yet former intelligence officials such as Mike Frost and Brian McInnis have 
lamented the capacity of the review system to hold CSIS to account, and referred to SIRC 
as more of a “lapdog” than a “watchdog” (Farson, 1996). Conversely, it might be argued 
that civilian review of secret intelligence operations actually impedes the ability of CSIS 
to perform its duty effectively, and that when SIRC attempts to interpret and apply the 
law to the activities of CSIS, beyond the CSIS Act, it is overstepping its mandate and 
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creating undue bureaucratic barriers that undermine effective intelligence operations. 
  By focusing on SIRC reports, which form an important aspect of the dialogue 
between SIRC and Parliament on matters related to CSIS operations, this chapter will 
demonstrate that SIRC has done a creditable job of ensuring that CSIS operates in 
accordance with its legislative mandate, Ministerial directives,xiii and its own operational 
policies, without compromising the effectiveness of intelligence operations. It does this 
by achieving a high degree of comity in its interactions with CSIS, and through 
recognizing the need in effective security intelligence review for a delicate balance 
between the rights of individuals and the security interests of the state. One of the most 
important ways that SIRC is able to achieve such a balance is by asserting its powers of 
review and reporting in a timely and prudent manner, seeking to provide remedial 
measures on matters that affect the internal procedural policies of CSIS, while not 
compromising the overall objectives of legislation or national security objectives and 
priorities.  
 The chapter consists of seven parts. The first part explores the role of the 
McDonald Commission and Pitfield Senate Committee in the genesis of SIRC. The 
second part examines SIRC’s official mandate as defined by the CSIS Act, to provide the 
reader with an understanding of the powers and responsibilities vested in SIRC. The third 
part demonstrates how SIRC has been able to minimize the tensions that can arise 
between an intelligence agency and the body charged with holding it to account. The 
fourth part will examine the role of federal security clearances in the relationship between 
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CSIS and SIRC, and in building the trust and confidence of CSIS. The fifth part will 
explain how SIRC’s reporting has also contributed to building trust and confidence 
between the two bodies. The sixth part will examine specific cases of SIRC reviews. 
Specifically, it will focus on instances in which SIRC has identified a particular action of 
CSIS as being in contravention of the CSIS Act, the Charter, or some other applicable 
legislation. The intent will be to show that SIRC, like the SCC, has, in performing a 
review function, struck a balance in seeking to protect the rights of individual Canadians 
while allowing the state to attend to Canada’s legitimate security interests.   
 
4.2 The Genesis of SIRC  
 4.2.1 The McDonald Commission 
The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP 
(McDonald Commission) tabled its report in 1981, recommending the separation of law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering activities, through the creation of CSIS. The 
report also identified serious flaws in the current auditing system for security intelligence 
agencies in Canada. To address this problem the Commission recommended the 
establishment of an external civilian review body (Farson, 1996). This would be achieved 
through the implementation of the CSIS Act (Bill C-157). 
 Leading up to these events, a thriving human rights culture had emerged in 
Canada. Although some Canadians were aware that the CSIS Act represented substantial 
progress in protecting against the coercive powers of government, many Canadians 
remained skeptical that the Act had sufficiently addressed the fundamental issues that had 
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enabled abuses of power by the RCMP in the context of the FLQ Crisis.  Based on this 
fact, the proposed legislation was opposed by a diverse range of groups such as the 
Canadian Bar Association, civil liberties associations, and several ethnic organizations 
(Smith, 2003: 2).  
  In response to these public concerns, a Special Committee of the Senate chaired 
by Senators P.M. Pitfield and Sidney Buckwold was established to undertake a 
preliminary review of the CSIS Act (Senate, 1983). 
  4.2.2 The Pitfield/Buckwold Committee: A Delicate Balance 
 
There is a very basic tension between the concepts of collective and 
individual security, and it must be addressed at virtually every stage in the 
formation and operation of a security intelligence agency. To a significant 
degree, individual rights depend upon maintenance of collective security. 
Both ends are desirable, but they also make competing demands on the 
institutions of a democratic state. Either end, by itself, could be easily 
attained, but at great expense to the other. The crucial task is to arrive at 
an appropriate balance of the two (Senate, 1983: 8-9).  
 
 The Pitfield/Buckwold Committee presented its report entitled Delicate Balance: 
A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society in November 1983. The report 
has become one of the most influential pronouncements on security intelligence in 
Canada, enunciating principles that have provided guidance for the activities CSIS and its 
internal and external review mechanisms.  
 Seventy-six different organizations and individuals appeared before the Senate 
Committee including police associations, former Solicitors General, and representatives 
of various provincial governments (Smith, 2003: 2). In addition, twenty-five briefs were 
submitted by major organizations (e.g., the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the 
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Canadian Labour Congress), human rights groups, and several individuals (Ibid.).   
 As a result of the work of this Committee, the CSIS Act (Bill C-9) received Royal 
Assent. The CSIS Act now represents the statutory framework of CSIS, and its internal 
(The Auditor General, Inspector General, the various Special Committee’s and 
Subcommittee, Ministers, Parliament, Directors, and Commissioners) and external 
(SIRC, courts) review system.xiv  
 
4.3 SIRC’s Mandate: Key Roles and Responsibilities   
 Undoubtedly, Canadian parliamentarians would not have authorized the 
extraordinary powers for CSIS, were they not convinced that the use of those powers was 
going to be subject to “continuous and thoroughgoing review” (SIRC, 1985: 3). To this 
end, the CSIS Act established the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the 
principle review body and watchdog of CSIS. SIRC is required to present an annual 
report to the Minister of Public Safety, who tables the report in Parliament.   
  
“SIRC’s reviews provide Parliament and Canadians with a comprehensive 
picture of the Service’s operations activities. SIRC also carefully examines 
how CSIS performs its duties and functions to determine if the Service is 
acting appropriately, effectively and in accordance with the law. SIRC’s 
reviews provide a retrospective examination and assessment of specific 
CSIS investigations and activities. The Committee’s reviews include 
findings and, where appropriate, ‘recommendations’ for the Service, and 
for the Minister of Public Safety. All SIRC’s reviews are [also] forwarded 
to both the Director of CSIS and the Inspector General of CSIS” (SIRC, 
2010: 8).  
 Described as a parliamentary “surrogate” (Farson, 1996), SIRC is given powers 
“as far reaching as its responsibilities” (SIRC, 1985: 4). It is entrusted by Parliament to 
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act on behalf of all Canadians not only as the principal external review mechanism for 
CSIS but also as a quasi-judicial tribunal to consider complaints about the activities of 
that body (SIRC, 1985: 3). Under the provision of Section 41 of the CSIS Act, SIRC must 
investigate complaints made by any person, pertaining to any act committed by CSIS 
(Ibid., 5). These complaints must first be filed with the Director of CSIS for vetting. It is 
worth noting that this practice has the potential to become problematic in the long-term, 
as it arguably creates a conflict of interest for the Director, who is accountable for 
misconduct by CSIS officials, but given a privileged role in determining which 
complaints will be reviewed by SIRC. In extreme cases, this provision of the CSIS Act 
could provide CSIS with increased opportunity to ignore, or clean-up, self-incriminating 
evidence. 
 It might be contended that there is an inadequate system of internal and external 
checks to ensure that the Director remains accountable for mishandling complaints. There 
is at least a problem of public perception when the Director of an intelligence agency is 
charged with vetting the legitimacy of allegations against the agency of which he or she 
is in control. This problem may partially explain why Omar Khadr’s legal counsel took 
his grievance to the courts rather than to SIRC. The concluding chapter of the thesis 
makes recommendations for a separate statute that includes provisions allowing 
complaints to be taken directly to SIRC, and vetted internally by the Committee.  
  Under Section 36.1(1) of the CSIS Act when, at any stage between the filing of a 
complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal, and before the hearing begins, the Canadian 
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Human Rights Commission receives written notice from any Minister that the practice 
upon which the complaint is based may related to the security of Canada, the Tribunal 
may either dismiss the case or refer it to SIRC (Ibid., 7). 
 Apart from its external review function, SIRC also serves as an appeals tribunal to 
consider any matter related to federal security clearances (SIRC, 1984: 6). This quasi-
judicial role (i.e., acting as an appeals tribunal) ensures fair treatment for Canadians 
whose employment or citizenship has been adversely affected, as a result of being denied 
security clearance. Before the CSIS Act was promulgated, most individuals remained 
unaware they had been denied clearance or, even if told, were not be given reasoning for 
the denial (Ibid., 7). Now, CSIS is required by law to give complainants as much 
information about their security clearance as is possible, without undermining national 
security (Ibid.). 
 Canada’s Citizenship Act was also amended so that the Minister of Immigration, 
upon believing that an individual should be denied citizenship because there is valid 
information to support the belief that the person will engage in actions that threaten 
Canada or constitute organized criminal activity, may make a report to SIRC (SIRC,  
1986: 8). 
 Finally, Canada’s Immigration Act was also amended to require that when the 
Minister of Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety believe that an applicant for 
admission to Canada will engage in the activities listed above, or subversion of 
government, or an act which has potential to endanger Canadian’s lives, they must report 
  48 
this to SIRC (Ibid.).  
 SIRC investigations ultimately result in a report or recommendation to the 
appropriate Minister (Ibid.) SIRC has the ability to review and rule on any and all CSIS 
activities, as “the CSIS Act gives SIRC full access to any information under the control of 
the Service… no matter how highly classified that information may be, with the sole 
exception of Cabinet confidences” (SIRC, 2010: 4). Therefore, SIRC has extensive 
authority to identify illegal practices and hold CSIS to account. However, if its officials 
are overbearing, demanding details regarding every activity CSIS performs and 
condemning even the smallest infractions, its ability to fulfill its mandate in protecting 
the security of the state will be undermined.  
 Thus, SIRC must make important judgment calls about what activities to review. 
The effectiveness of the external review regime rests on the Committee’s ability to make 
sound judgments. SIRC must ensure that CSIS operates within legal parameters of its 
defined operational mandate without unduly constraining its ability to conduct 
intelligence work.  
 SIRC’s Annual Reports serve as the source of information from which cabinet 
ministers, and to a lesser extent Members of Parliament and the public, may learn about 
CSIS. In a democratic society, this information can serve to catalyze the public to 
pressure government into cutting back funding for intelligence services. Therefore, CSIS 
has an interest in cooperating with the review process and operating within its legally 
defined parameters. As the legacy of the RCMP Security Service has demonstrated, 
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corrupt or questionable practices that result from ineffective control and accountability 
can result in reform of the entire security intelligence system, and the establishment of 
new principles of operation. Thus CSIS and SIRC have a mutual interest in preserving 
and refining the current system and operating effectively pursuant to their respective 
mandates.  
 
4.4 Bridging the Divide: Overcoming the Conflict Inherent in Intelligence Review  
  The relationship between an organization and its oversight or auditing agency is 
inevitably prone to tension or conflict as the former attempts to resist the restrictive 
controls asserted by the latter. SIRC recognizes that its mandate may create an adversarial 
relationship with CSIS, and that occasions will inevitably arise in which its position 
differs from that of CSIS (SIRC, 2005: 4). At the same time, the effectiveness of this 
system depends on a high degree of mutual trust and cooperation between CSIS and 
SIRC.  
 This is due to the fact that the effectiveness of intelligence operations is often 
contingent on being conducted in a manner that goes undetected. As a result, much of 
what intelligence agencies do cannot be substantiated or corroborated by neutral 
observers. Because of this, and despite the fact that SIRC, like the SCC, has the power to 
subpoena any information or persons related to the activities of CSIS, sometimes it must 
rely on honesty from CSIS officials, even when such honesty may be self-incriminating. 
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Clearly, in order to maximize effectiveness, intelligence review depends on a high 
degree of institutional trust between the intelligence agency and its review body. SIRC 
members knew from the start that CSIS would be reluctant to be totally open with 
information, especially information that was not even distributed within CSIS itself 
except on a need-to-know basis (SIRC, 1985: 11). It was recognized at a very early stage 
that a solid foundation of trust and confidence between the two organizations would be 
vitally important both for CSIS and SIRC to fulfill their respective responsibilities (Ibid., 
11). This was underscored in a recent SIRC publication stating that  “the relationship 
between CSIS and SIRC [has] benefited from a deepening mutual respect for each other’s 
work and responsibilities” (SIRC, 2005). This is not only due to the affinity they share by 
virtue of being created for the same purpose –– to establish an effective and accountable 
system of security intelligence and protect the rights and freedoms of Canadians –– but 
also to SIRC’s actions and policies being designed to gain the confidence of CSIS (Ibid.).   
 Much credit for the positive relationship has been given to the actions of various 
SIRC members who, due the secretive nature of their work, will receive little recognition 
for their contributions. In ‘Reflections: 25 Years of Service’, SIRC stated that its second 
Chairman, John Bassett (1989-1992), deserves credit for the improved relations between 
CSIS and SIRC throughout the 1990s (SIRC, 2005). Bassett made remarkable 
contributions in helping construct a more workable relationship with CSIS through 
responsible and effective leadership, characterized by such traits as mutual respect and 
open dialogue (SIRC, 2005).  
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What follows is a brief account of some of the policies that have been undertaken 
by SIRC to build institutional trust between the two agencies, upon which effective 
review can occur.  
 4.4.1 Security Clearances: The Appointment of SIRC Members and SIRC’s 
 Review of Federal Security Clearances  
 In what may be viewed as the first gesture of good faith, Senator Ronald G. Atkey 
requested that all staff of SIRC be cleared to ‘Top Secret’ (Ibid.). CSIS is in charge of all 
security clearances related to employment with federal departments, and as a result is 
responsible for determining the eligibility of SIRC personnel. SIRC also established the 
practice of relying on CSIS personnel to handle transportation of its sensitive documents, 
and also enlisted RCMP specialists to secure its permanent offices (Ibid.). Cumulatively, 
these measures have facilitated long-term trust and cooperation between SIRC and CSIS, 
without which the process of security intelligence review would have been undermined.   
 To anyone who does not have a full understanding of SIRC’s hiring process and 
its power in reviewing security clearances, there may be a concern that the above 
mentioned measures went too far. A particular concern is that CSIS can be very selective 
in choosing its preferred candidates for SIRC membership from those referred to it by 
government. However, the consultation process for selecting prospective SIRC members 
ensures that CSIS’s influence is limited to a list of candidates selected by democratically 
elected Members of Parliament. Furthermore, it is unlikely that CSIS would have any 
interest in expressing a preference for some candidates over others, because there is no 
guarantee that any Committee member would be more lenient in assessing the actions of 
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CSIS and its members.   
 SIRC consists of a Chairman, and no more than four and no less than two other 
members, who are appointed by the Privy Council Office, in consultation with the Prime 
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, and the leader of each 
party in Parliament holding a minimum of twelve seats (CSIS Act, 34 {1} and {2}). This 
selection process, which includes consultation with all major federal parties, ensures a 
high degree of efficacy in the Committee selection process by preventing any one agent 
or body from have undue influence within the Committee.  
 4.4.2 Balanced and Conscientious Reporting  
  SIRC’s 1991-1992 Annual Report remarked that anyone who had read the SIRC 
reports to that point would likely note the “annual reports change from being 
compendiums of direct and implied criticism, in the early years, to being a much more 
supportive account for CSIS’s activities in recent years” (SIRC, 2005). Mr. Bassett 
contended that the progressive and definitive shift in the rhetoric towards increasingly 
more supportive accounts of CSIS’s activities was simply the effect of CSIS maturing as 
an agency to a point of being unrecognizable as the successor to the RCMP Security 
Service (SIRC, 1992).  
 Although there can be little doubt that CSIS was able to improve its practices over 
the first eight years of its existence, Bassett’s comments do not fully explain why SIRC 
began to tone down the critical language in its reports. Nor does it accurately depict CSIS 
as it existed in 1992. It is clear from subsequent SIRC reports that ties still exist between 
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CSIS and the RCMP.  Such ties remain not only because SIRC was partially staffed from 
the RCMP upon its creation but also because of SIRC’s inheritance of a massive volume 
of files from the RCMP Security Service upon the latter’s dissolution (SIRC, 2005).   
 The shift away from hostile criticisms towards a more positive assessment of 
CSIS activities may be regarded not only as the result of the institutional maturation of 
CSIS but also pragmatic and utilitarian considerations such as the need to enhance 
cooperation between the two agencies, through considered and balanced reporting. This 
should not be seen as regressive, or a sign that SIRC is not fulfilling its mandate, but a 
progressive evolution towards constructive engagement between the two bodies.  
 This shift must have been, at least partially, the product of a realization by SIRC 
that it is ineffective and counterproductive to slap CSIS on the wrist or publicly condemn 
it for every infraction, however slight. Rather, SIRC’s foremost responsibility has been, 
and continues to be ensuring that any transgressions perpetrated by CSIS are adequately 
addressed, and do not manifest themselves in the long-term conduct of CSIS operatives in 
acts of corruption, or in any way contribute to the kind of turmoil and social upheaval 
that resulted from the actions of its predecessor – the Security Service of the RCMP. This 
does not mean that violations of law should be tolerated, but rather that intelligence work 
requires intelligence officers to make difficult judgment calls without warning, and that 
the legal parameters governing this work must be tested, and cannot be static or 
overscupulous.   
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SIRC recognizes that its annual reports have the potential to create doubts about 
CSIS, in the eyes of the public. They can actually prompt significant public pressure in 
the form of lobbying and other forms of dissent that constrain CSIS or tighten its 
accountability structure, thereby limiting CSIS’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Therefore, 
there is a need for balanced and conscientious reporting.  
 In judging the efficiency and effectiveness of SIRC’s work in this regard, one 
must remember that any review committee or auditing agency will have a tendency to 
focus on the negative activities of the review subject, by virtue of its role in reviewing 
complaints and alleged wrongdoing. However, SIRC must be conscious of the integral 
role it plays in shaping the opinions of government officials and the public towards CSIS. 
It also must ensure that the CSIS does not become reluctant to share information with its 
officials –– because if that were to happen the control and accountability mechanisms 
would be weakened.  As noted above, it cannot be forgotten that the quality of the review 
process is ultimately contingent on a degree of institutional trust between SIRC and 
CSIS. Such trust is imperative especially because there is no official record of CSIS’s 
activities.  
 There is much reason to believe that CSIS operates in an ethical fashion, and that 
the increasingly positive and supportive tone with which SIRC has reported on CSIS is 
due to the improvement of CSIS’s intelligence policies and practices over the years. Most 
obvious would be the fact that there has not been any allegations or proof that CSIS has 
been part of any illegal or unethical activities comparable to those perpetrated either by 
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its predecessor in various instances, or by its US counterpart, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). There is nothing to compare it, for example, with the CIA’s involvement 
in the Iran-Contra Affair, in training and assisting insurgents (Wolf), or in drug 
smuggling (Webb, 1996). There have been some serious allegations that have come 
against CSIS, such as the erasure of tapes in the case of Air India, but they have been 
infrequent and inconclusive. 
 
4.5 Case Studies 
 This section will study three reviews, in which SIRC identified a particular action 
or policy of CSIS as being in contravention of the CSIS Act or the Charter. The overall 
goal is to determine the extent to which SIRC, in reviewing CSIS’s actions in seeking to 
protect national security interests, has limited or facilitated the prospective policy options 
available to CSIS and Parliament.  
 Again, the study employs dialogue theory as an analytical framework in 
examining SIRC‘s judgments. It views SIRC as the principle interpreter of the CSIS Act, 
and makes the argument that its reports form part of a dialogue between itself and 
Parliament, in which the reports elicit a response from Parliament, which retains the final 
say in determining policy outcomes.  
 Having been reviewed by both the SCC and then SIRC, the case of Omar Khadr is 
of particular interest as it generated both a decision by the SCC and a SIRC report. In the 
review of matters related to the Mohammed Mansour Jabarah case, SIRC looked at many 
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of the considerations that likely would have been considered by the courts had the case 
been reviewed there. Its decision highlights the interplay between SIRC and judges, as 
well as the capacity of SIRC to act as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Finally, the Report on the 
Heritage Front Affair remains SIRC’s most comprehensive and voluminous report on the 
conduct of CSIS to date (Farson, 1996), and provides an excellent demonstration of 
SIRC’s capacity to meet the complex challenges required to conduct a thorough security 
intelligence review. 
 4.5.1 Omar Khadr   
  SIRC has increasingly found itself considering Charter-related cases, such as the 
case of Omar Khadr. Khadr is a Canadian citizen who was thrust onto the international 
stage as having been the only child soldier detained at Guantanamo Bay (CBC News, 
2010b). In February 2003, Khadr’s lawyers released video footage showing CSIS 
officials interviewing him at Guantanamo. Immediately after the video was released, 
SIRC initiated a review to determine the “…nature and extent of CSIS’s involvement in 
this matter, including reasons for the Service’s decision to interview Khadr” (SIRC, 
2009: 9).   
 Although SIRC maintained that CSIS had conducted the interviews on reasonable 
grounds related to national security, and that “the Canadian government fully supported 
CSIS’s visit to and interview of Khadr at Guantanamo Bay” (SIRC, 2009), it concluded 
that CSIS failed to adequately consider two extra-intelligence matters, namely Khadr’s 
age at the time CSIS conducted its interview, and human rights concerns (Ibid., 10). 
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SIRC also found and expressed concern that information gained in the interview had been 
shared with “American partners” (SIRC, 2009).  
 Due to their status as minors, youth have been granted certain fundamental rights 
in Canadian and international law embodied in the provisions of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child respectively. SIRC found 
no evidence to suggest that CSIS considered any of these laws in its decision to conduct 
the interview (Ibid., 12). Rather, the “decision to interview Khadr was prompted 
primarily by intelligence considerations” (Ibid., 10). Moreover, according to SIRC, at the 
time of the CSIS interview in 2003, there had already been widespread media coverage of 
the alleged abuses and mistreatment of Guantanamo detainees. SIRC found nothing that 
would lead it to believe that CSIS took into account any of these factors in interviewing 
Khadr (Ibid.).  
 SIRC maintains that information sharing with foreign countries will continue to 
be a difficult issue, possibly placing CSIS in a vulnerable position when courts find that 
CSIS is in violation of Charter rights, as it did in this case (Ibid., 12). Therefore, to “keep 
pace with the political and legal developments in recent years” (Ibid.), SIRC 
recommended that CSIS “develop a policy framework to guide its interactions with 
youth” and “implement measures to embed the values stemming from recent political, 
judicial and legal developments” in its operations; it also recommended and that in doing 
so it should seek Ministerial guidance. Additionally, SIRC encouraged CSIS to consider 
pursuing “extra-intelligence” matters, in carrying out its operations, such as applying the 
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Charter to international cases. It further remarked that the need to expand CSIS’s 
mandate to include greater foreign intelligence capacity will require CSIS to demonstrate 
that it has the experience, professionalism and know-how to make difficult and 
sophisticated decisions when operating abroad (Ibid., 13).  
 The need for CSIS to be conscientious and act in a sophisticated manner is 
particularly important during periods of crisis or intense changes as “periods of intense 
change, [such as that following 9/11,] often result in substantial policy gaps… [as events 
move more quickly than the ability of policy makers or parliamentarians to 
make]…necessary statutory or policy reforms” (SIRC, 2010: 6). In a recent parliamentary 
appearance, former SIRC Chair, Gary Filmon, stated that “CSIS needs government 
direction on these matters to ensure that it is operating overseas in a way that reflects 
government priorities” (Ibid.).  
 Over the years, SIRC has proven its ability to ensure that CSIS operates within 
the law. Even in cases where no clear law has been broken, SIRC has demonstrated a 
propensity to identify what it perceives to be CSIS misconduct, as defined by relevant 
laws such as the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the UN Convention on the Rights of a 
Child –– such as the case of CSIS’s interview with Khadr at Guantanamo Bay. In the 
Khadr case, SIRC made it clear that CSIS must act in accordance with Canadian law, and 
any other applicable law, regardless of where in the world CSIS may be operating. In 
Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), the SCC reached similar conclusions. But SIRC 
went beyond the SCC decisions –– by ruling that CSIS must operate not only legally but 
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also ethically, and thus must think about the potentially detrimental effects of its 
operations (Ibid.). 
 SIRC is not officially mandated to consider any matters related to the operation of 
CSIS that fall outside of the purview of the CSIS Act. When it does, as it did in the Khadr 
case regarding the applicability of the Charter to the operations of CSIS abroad (SIRC, 
2009), it is arguable that it was violating the parameters of its official mandate.  However, 
in its review of the Khadr case, SIRC demonstrated respect for the authority of the SCC, 
the country’s supreme legal body. The evidence shows that the SCC and SIRC were 
actually able to play a complementary role in the function of external intelligence review 
–- although it is .  the SCC that, under Section 24 of the Charter, has the uncontestable 
power to provide remedial measures in instances in which some branch of government is 
found to have acted illegally.  
 Readers of the SIRC’s Omar Khadr report may remark that it appears truncated, 
and that SIRC could have expanded the scope of its research and reporting.  However, 
one must consider that SIRC is mandated to review the activities of CSIS, and therefore 
extra-intelligence matters such as the implications of information sharing with “American 
partners” (SIRC, 2009) in terms of Khadr’s right to be repatriated to Canada, fall outside 
the purview of this mandate. 
 In conclusion, SIRC’s report on Omar Khadr is seen here as forming part of a 
long-term dialogue between SIRC, CSIS, cabinet and Parliament regarding CSIS’s 
operations abroad. SIRC insisted that CSIS must abide by a number of domestic and 
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international legal codes in the conduct of foreign intelligence operations including the 
Charter, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. SIRC also insisted that CSIS “develop a policy framework to guide its interactions 
with youth” and “implement measures to embed the values stemming from recent 
political, judicial and legal developments” in its operations; it also recommended and that 
in doing so it should seek Ministerial guidance. 
SIRC’s Omar Khadr report also represents a more direct form of intra-
governmental dialogue not covered under dialogue theory– Parliamentary appearances by 
current and former judges and SIRC members. Such was the case with the recent 
appearance of former SIRC Chair Gary Filmon before Parliament to discuss matters 
related the case of Omar Khadr (SIRC, 2010; 6).   
 4.5.2 Mohammed Mansour Jabarah 
 Another Charter-related review conducted by SIRC was the case of Mohammed 
Mansour Jabarah, a self-proclaimed al Qaida operative and Canadian citizen. Jabarah had 
plotted to bomb the US and Israeli embassies in Manila and Singapore, but the plan was 
thwarted and he was detained in Oman in March 2002. CSIS officials traveled on short 
notice to interview the detained suspect. Omanis officials handed Jabarah over to CSIS, 
who paid for his return to Canada, and then escorted him to the US to face prosecution 
(SIRC, 2007: 18). CSIS claims that Jabarah went to the US voluntarily; however, the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and Jabarah himself have challenged this claim 
(CBC News, 2004).  
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 Section 54 of the CSIS Act provides that SIRC may supply the Minister of Public 
Safety with a special report on any matter related to CSIS activities. On the basis of 
concerns raised by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, SIRC initiated its review of 
the case (Ibid., 18).  
  In the prefatory section of its report, SIRC explicitly recognized that “there are 
individuals who will seek to exploit Canada’s rights and freedoms in order to harm our 
country…citizens and neighbours [and that]…security intelligence agencies can prompt 
impassioned debate about whether the ends can ever justify the means” (SIRC, 2007: V). 
SIRC’s judgment was that, however heinous Jabarah’s crimes were, he was “…entitled to 
all of the rights and freedoms afforded to any other citizen under our Charter” (Ibid.). 
SIRC’s main responsibility was to protect these rights by making certain that CSIS was 
acting within the law, as it must always be expected to do – “no matter [where or with 
whom] unexpected circumstances may arise” (Ibid., 22). Therefore CSIS should carefully 
consider SIRC’s analysis and try to understand why SIRC was “[taking] issue with some 
of [its] actions” (Ibid., vi).  
 SIRC drew on the comments made by Justice Ian Binnie of the SCC in a 2004 
speech, in which he described the dichotomy between national security and human rights 
as a “clash of titans” (Ibid., 20). SIRC acknowledged that the events related to Jabarah 
occurred immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks and therefore Canada’s 
protection and cooperation with its allies throughout the intelligence community would 
have been a top priority. Regardless, CSIS “[had] knowledge that Section 32 of the 
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Charter…[applied] to [its] actions” (Ibid.) Having examined the events that transpired 
during Jabarah’s time in Canada, and being aware that CSIS arranged for his travel to the 
US on a Canadian aircraft, SIRC sought assurance that CSIS had “exercised due 
diligence to ensure its actions were in accordance with Canadian law” (Ibid.).  
 SIRC measured the legality of CSIS’s activities against Ministerial Directives, 
CSIS’s operational policy and procedures, their bearing on the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, and the relevance of the CSIS Act (Ibid., 19). It rejected CSIS’s claims that 
Jabarah had decided to provide information freely and voluntarily. It found that his 
decision had been made without proper legal representation and thus resulted in his self-
incrimination (Ibid.). 
 SIRC received legal advice from the Honourable Gérard LaForest, C.C., Q.C., an 
expert on the Charter and former member of the SCC. It concurred with LaForest that 
several issues related to the involvement of CSIS officials would be meticulously 
scrutinized by the SCC (Ibid.), if this case were to come before the SCC. It also 
recognized that a court would likely consider other factors such as “his age; his emotional 
state; whether his fear of the alternatives influenced his return to Canada from Oman; the 
length of time he spent in the company of CSIS officials while in Canada; and the 
circumstances surrounding his decision to surrender himself to a foreign jurisdiction” 
(Ibid.).  
 SIRC took issue with the fact that Jabarah was not read his rights by CSIS, a fact 
that was subsequently confirmed by CSIS. It also rejected CSIS’s attempt to justify its 
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actions based on the argument that “CSIS is not a police service” (Ibid.). SIRC rejected 
this claim as a serious “misunderstanding of the application of the Charter to government 
representatives carrying out their official duties” (Ibid.).  SIRC concluded that Jabarah 
was arbitrarily detained by CSIS, in violation of Section 9 of the Charter, due to the fact 
that his crimes predated Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, and therefore he “could not be 
prosecuted for any crime in Canada” (Ibid., 21). SIRC also found that Jabarah’s arbitrary 
detention meant that his right to silence was violated, as protected by Sections 7 and 
11(c), “as was his right to counsel under s.10” (Ibid.). Additionally, “his right to remain 
in Canada as protected by s. 6 of the Charter (mobility rights) was breached” (Ibid.).  
 Acting on information from another Canadian agency that Jabarah could not be 
criminally charged, since his crimes were not crimes in Canada at the time, but that he 
could be prosecuted in the US, CSIS materially assisted US enforcement officials in his 
detention and prosecution. This led SIRC to say that “CSIS could not be independent 
with respect to any consultations that it carried out with Jabarah” and that CSIS had 
“…strayed from its security intelligence mandate into the area of law enforcement” 
(Ibid.).  
 Based on this review SIRC proposed the following remedial measures:  
i) that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed between CSIS and the DFAIT 
in 1987 should be updated to specify that DFAIT would in future act as the lead agency 
in any cases related to Canadian citizens detained abroad. Furthermore, the MOU should 
reflect recommendations by Mr. Justice O’Connor, namely, that there must be “…timely 
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and open consultation among Canadian agencies…[involved with Canadians detained 
abroad] (SIRC, 2007: 21); 
ii) that CSIS’s internal policies be amended so that all email messages were automatically 
retained unless “there [was] a conscious decision to delete them” (Ibid.); 
iii) that CSIS offer clarification to its employees regarding what constitutes “recorded 
information” as opposed to “transitory records”, and thus regarding which files must be 
retained under federal legislation (Ibid.);  
iv) that CSIS keep written accounts of all “interdepartmental consultations, [whether 
formal or informal,]… with DFAIT and the Department of Justice” (Ibid);  
v) that CSIS take measures to ensure that all information under its control, including but 
not limited to emails, was stored, retrieved and retained by means that complied “…with 
all applicable federal legislation, including the CSIS, Privacy, Access to Information and 
Library and Archives of Canada Acts” (Ibid., 21);  
vi) that CSIS request and receive written consultation from Canada’s Department of 
Justice in any circumstance where a Canadian citizen was questioned “in circumstances 
that [might] give rise to detention in order to ensure that the individual’s Charter rights 
[were] respected, and in all occasions when it [was] unclear whether the Service’s 
activity [fell] within its statutory mandate under Section 12 of the CSIS Act” (Ibid.,22). 
 The sixth recommendation is particularly reflective of SIRC’s overall aims, which 
are to provide clearer detail on measures that govern the authority of CSIS, to engage 
Canadian citizens detained abroad, and to improve overall record-keeping practices 
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(Ibid., 22). Greater detail on such measures was to be achieved primarily through 
formalizing a request of approval from the Department of Justice when CSIS sought to 
question individuals in circumstances “which [might] give rise to detention” (Ibid). These 
measures were recommended “in order to ensure that the individual’s Charter-rights 
[were] respected”, regardless of where in the world they may find themselves (Ibid.).  
 Although these recommendations made high demands of CSIS’s operational 
policies, they were consistent with previous and subsequent recommendations by SIRC 
and the SCC on the handling of Canadians citizens abroad (Khadr v. Canada; Burns v. 
United States; SIRC, 2009). It must be remembered that the issue of CSIS dealing with 
Canadian citizens abroad has been a recurring one, in relation to several cases. Therefore, 
SIRC’s recommendations were informed by other official inquiries into the matter, such 
as that taken up by the SCC in Khadr v. Canada. 
SIRC found that Jabarah had been arbitrarily detained in violation of Sections 6, 
7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Charter, and proposed six remedial measures to rectify the errors. 
However, it did not challenge the provisions of the CSIS Act,xv but rather focused on 
changing procedures such as those around information retention and engagement with 
other government departments (DFAIT). Although this can be seen as a hard-line report 
because it had serious implications for Canadian foreign policy related to the treatment of 
Canadian citizens abroad, it can also be seen as consistent with the principle of dialogue 
theory that states that “judicially-imposed constitutional norms rarely defeat a desired 
legislative policy [but rather] they generally operate at the margins of legislative policy, 
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affecting issues of process, enforcement of standards, all which can accommodate more 
legislative objectives” (Hogg et al., 1997).  
 4.5.3 The Heritage Front Affair 
 In August 1994, a media report alleged that Grant Bristow, a leader in the 
Heritage Front (a Toronto white supremacist group) who helped build the organization 
into one of the most successful racist gangs in Canada, had engaged in a harassment 
campaign against anti-racists, and spied on the Reform Party at the behest of Mulroney’s 
Progressive Conservative Government, while employed by CSIS, receiving upwards of 
$60,000 per year (Chase, 1994: 1; SIRC, 1995: 3). 
 The day after the initial allegation about Bristow surfaced in the media, SIRC 
began its review of the case (SIRC, 1995: 3). The review sought to assess the procedures 
by which the informants had been engaged and handled by CSIS. As months passed, 
more allegations surfaced suggesting that Bristow had also provided money and 
intelligence about Jewish groups and individuals to racists in the US, and spied on the 
CBC as well as the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (Ibid.). In September, Preston 
Manning, leader of the Reform Party, charged that CSIS had cost his party seats in the 
1993 federal election, by successfully planting John Beck, a white supremacist, as a party 
candidate in Ontario (Alberta Report, 1994).  
 SIRC submitted its 200-page report on this case to the Solicitor General of 
Canada on December 9, 1994, entitled The Heritage Front Affair. Due to the high level of 
public attention devoted to this case, SIRC produced a review that remains one of SIRC’s 
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most critical and detailed reports concerning CSIS’s investigative methods involving 
informants (Farson, 1996). Completed in less than four months, the review addressed all 
questions that had been raised by government officials and the media prior to the report, 
and disproved all of the most troubling allegations that had been leveled against CSIS. It 
ruled that CSIS did not attempt to infiltrate the Reform Party (SIRC, 1994: 13.5), or spy 
on the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Canadian Jewish Congress, or the CBC. 
Most importantly, it found that CSIS had been justified in using a human source to 
penetrate an extreme right-wing group because the source provided valuable information 
to government and local police forces that served to protect “…the Jewish community 
against racists”; and as well it had played an important role in ensuring that a number of 
extremists were arrested, detained and deported (SIRC, 1994). SIRC did note that, 
although Bristow had not engaged in subversive activities himself to undermine the 
Reform Party, his close associate Wolfgang Droege had tried to discredit the party prior 
to the 1993 federal election (Ibid., 13.5).  
 SIRC did criticize CSIS on two counts. One was that some of the information that 
had been collected and retained by CSIS in conjunction with its investigation did not 
meet the criterion of “strictly necessary” as defined under Section 12 of the CSIS Act. 
Secondly, in one particular case, it took too long to remove Bristow from an assignment. 
The incident occurred in June 1991 when the CSIS’s Toronto regional office was 
informed that Bristow had been involved with a security group that provided protection 
for Preston Manning at a rally in Mississauga (Ibid.). It was not until August that 
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“Service Headquarter instructed the Toronto Region that Bristow, referred to as the 
‘Source’, was to have nothing more to do with the Reform Party” (Ibid.). SIRC ruled that 
this instruction had come two months too late, and that the instruction should have been 
handed down the same month the Service was informed. SIRC also found that the 
“instruction from Headquarters…[had] not been sufficiently precise”…[because although 
it] reiterated that there was to be no reporting on the Reform Party…it did not explicitly 
state that the Source was to leave the security group” (Ibid.).  
 SIRC also suggested that improvements were required in the policy guidelines 
provided by the Solicitor General regarding the operations of CSIS. It noted that, 
although the Solicitor General released “comprehensive guidelines for the use of Human 
Sources” on October 20th 1989, the “level of policy guidance available to CSIS officers 
[was] seriously deficient” (Ibid., 13.11). SIRC concluded that “current directions from 
the Solicitor General and the Director” should be reexamined and refined to address a 
number of issues, including how proactive a source may be in engaging an organization 
targeted by CSIS, and whether the benefits of intelligence or source activities outweigh 
the benefits of direct police action” (Ibid.).  
 The Solicitor General, who may issue directives to the CSIS, issued three new 
Ministerial Directives to SIRC in 1995-96, primarily to address the issues in SIRC’s 
report on the Heritage Front case. Among these directives was one that sought to provide 
clearer guidelines for CSIS’s engagement with informants and other human sources: the 
Assistant Director of CSIS was now required to “oversee and report to the Director on 
  69 
important operational matters” (SIRC, 1996: 37). In its follow-up report, SIRC continued 
to insist that “the level of policy guidance available to CSIS” in the area of human 
sources remained “seriously deficient,” and that “direction and policy in this area should 
be re-examined” (Ibid.). After identifying the problems with CSIS’s operational 
procedures in the Heritage Front case, SIRC brought these to the attention of the 
government and asked it to ensure that appropriate remedial measures were developed 
and implemented. 
SIRC’s Heritage Front Affair report demonstrates that not only does SIRC have 
an important role to play in holding CSIS to account but an equally important role in 
disproving false allegations that may come against it and compromise its legitimacy. 
SIRC disproved all of the major allegations against CSIS, however it did criticize the 
collection and retention of information by CSIS as not meeting the criterion of strictly 
necessary, as well as the excessive length of time it took CSIS to remove Bristow from 
assignment, once his association with the Reform Party became known.  
 SIRC found the level of policy guidance available to CSIS in the “management of 
human sources” to be seriously deficient, and suggested improvements in the policy 
guidelines provided by the Solicitor General. Supporting the view that SIRC reports form 
part of a dialogue with Parliament and the executive, the Solicitor General issued three 
new Ministerial Directives to CSIS in 1995-96, focusing on the management of human 
sources. In a follow-up report, SIRC found this response to be insufficient and ruled that 
the level of policy guidance available to CSIS officers still remained seriously deficient.  
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 The Heritage Front case can be regarded as what dialogue theorists refer to as a 
‘second look case’ in which judicial or quasi-judicial bodies determine the sufficiency of 
legislative replies (Roach, 2007; 173). Kent Roach agrees with the principle articulated 
by Hogg and Bushell that the correct approach in second look cases is “simply to 
determine whether the new legislation has been demonstrably justified as a limitation 
on…rights” (Ibid.). Furthermore, SIRC and the courts must be willing to invalidate reply 
legislation where appropriate (Ibid.,174), as “striking down reply legislation does not 
equate to judicial supremacy” (Roach, 2007a; 466).  
  
4.6 Conclusions 
 By focusing on SIRC reports, viewed as forming part of the dialogue between 
SIRC and Parliament on matters related to the activities of CSIS, this chapter has drawn 
attention to the efforts that SIRC has made to find a balance between establishing an 
effective working relationship with CSIS, cabinet and Parliament based on mutual respect 
and trust, while protecting individual and group rights by working to hold CSIS to 
account. A critical element of this balance has been SIRC’s conscientious and prudent 
approach to exerting its powers of review and reporting, and its cautious approach to the 
provision of remedial measures in instances in which it judges actions by CSIS officers to 
be illegal. It has exercised a similar role to the SCC, to the extent that it takes into 
account a myriad of complex factors that impinge upon intelligence operations and their 
review, while exhibiting pragmatism in its awareness of the potential effects of its actions 
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on such operations. This pragmatic approach to intelligence review is clearly evident in 
the three cases examined above – Omar Khadr,  Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, and the 
Heritage Front Affair, in each of which SIRC found CSIS to be in contravention of the 
CSIS Act, the Charter and/or other applicable legislation. Involving similar allegations 
and circumstances as Khadr, the Jabarah case is particularly valuable in highlighting 
what a SIRC decision looks like when its officials consult with judicial experts. SIRC 
consulted a former Justice of the SCC in the case, who went so far as to suggest how the 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis, Conclusions and Further Discussion 
5.1  Analysis  
 The central purpose of this thesis has been to examine how the SCC and SIRC 
interact with Parliament and cabinet with regard to the review of the CSIS. Toward that 
end, the thesis has employed dialogue theory as a conceptual and analytical framework.  
As a conceptual framework, dialogue theory tells us that a dialogue occurs 
between the SCC and SIRC, on the one hand, and the cabinet and Parliament on the 
other, “…in which the latter retains the final say” (Hogg et al., 1997). This does not mean 
that SCC decisions and SIRC reports are unimportant; nor does it mean that these 
institutions should take a deferential approach to upholding rights. Rather, it means that 
the process of ensuring that CSIS respects the rights of Canadians is a democratic one, 
whereby judicial pronouncements are to be obeyed, but leave room for a legislative 
response (Roach, 2001; 239).  This dialogue makes all government bodies involved in 
security intelligence decisions, and the review of these decisions, more accountable to 
each other thereby enhancing democracy (Ibid., 176).   
As an analytical framework, dialogue theory identifies potential avenues of 
dialogue between judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and Parliament. In this case, it seeks 
to measure the ongoing interaction, or dialogue, between the SCC and SIRC, on the one 
hand, and cabinet and Parliament on the other, in security intelligence cases.  
  73 
 Chapters 3 and 4 examined instances in which the SCC and SIRC identified a 
particular action by CSIS, as a violation of the Charter, CSIS Act, or some other 
applicable legislation. They demonstrate the commitment made by the SCC and SIRC to 
maintain the “delicate” balance between state interests and individual rights, as described 
by Pitfield/Buckwold Committee Senate Report. This balance includes a demonstrable 
respect for Parliament’s authority to make laws, and Cabinet’s authority over foreign 
affairs.  
The thesis has also cast light on the distinct but complementary functions 
performed by the SCC and SIRC in providing independent review of the activities of 
CSIS. The former (SCC) is a constitutionally created institution with the authority to 
invalidate statutes. The latter (SIRC) is a statutorily created review body, with significant 
auditing powers.  
It is most accurate to describe the system that performs external review of CSIS as 
in flux –– even though the critics will argue that it is in crisis. Although the system 
appears to be functioning well, it is important that emerging issues identified by 
thoroughgoing review be addressed before they become problematic and threaten its 
effectiveness.   
 Beyond the Federal Court’s authority to approve CSIS warrants, the CSIS Act 
provides the judiciary with no formal authority to review the activities of CSIS. However, 
the SCC and SIRC do exercise an important correlated review function, which should 
serve to enrich and inform the public discussion of security intelligence in Canada which 
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SIRC called for in its 2009-2010 Report (2010, 3).  
 Thus far, the courts and SIRC have demonstrated a high level of mutual 
institutional respect, facilitating a cooperative, rather than competitive working 
relationship (SIRC, 2005). In the absence of clear guidelines, SIRC and the SCC have 
attempted to establish jurisdictional boundaries by refusing to review each other’s work 
(SCC decisions or SIRC reports), as this is not in their mandate (Ibid.).  
  As SIRC says in its 1989-1990 Annual Report, its internal processes are much like 
that of a court (SIRC, 1990).  In the review of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, SIRC even 
enlisted the consultation of the Honourable Gérard LaForest, C.C., Q.C., and as a result, 
the report included considerations and conclusions that might have been expressed in a 
SCC decision. In fact there is no policy guidance for when a case should go before SIRC, 
and when it should go before the SCC. This means that the SCC may be doing some 
work that should or could be conducted by SIRC, and vice versa. It is arguable that the 
lack of legal codification addressing the overlapping and complementary roles of the 
SCC and SIRC has the potential to become problematic if current self-restraint is thrown 
off, and either review body decides to compete for jurisdictional authority, or if they 
begin to challenge the authority of the other.  
 Such an overlapping of jurisdictional authority occurred in the case of Omar 
Khadr, in which both the SCC and SIRC undertook a review of the matters in question. 
The success of the SCC and SIRC in conducting their respective reviews without 
challenging or undermining each other’s authority can be attributed to their restraint. 
  75 
However, under the current legal framework, such restraint is voluntary at best and 
temporary at worst. If this mutual respect breaks down, it might undermine the entire 
intelligence review network, which is contingent on a high level of cooperation between 
all those involved in the security intelligence sector.  
  It is also arguable that the respective roles of the SCC and SIRC need to be 
clarified. More specifically, clarification is needed regarding when a review should be 
undertaken by SIRC, and/or by the courts, and guidance provided as to how SIRC and the 
SCC might engage each other in such a process.   
 Rather than amending the current CSIS Act, such clarification could be achieved 
by abolishing the current Act, and re-drafting two distinctive pieces of legislation –– one 
governing the mandate of CSIS, and the other governing the mandates of all those 
charged with ensuring that the CSIS is held to account, including the Director, Ministers, 
the Inspector General, Auditor General, various House and Senate committees, CSIS and 
SIRC.   
 Such a change would allow the SCC to continue to concern itself primarily with 
matters of substantive justice under the Charter, whereas SIRC could be primarily 
concerned with matters of procedural justice, closely monitoring CSIS policies to ensure 
legality and fairness. Secondly, the new legislation might include provisions similar to 
section 36.1(1) of the Human Rights Act, which allows complaints to the Human Rights 
Tribunal to be referred to SIRC, if they involve matters of national security. SIRC could 
be encouraged to review cases such as Khadr, prior to their submission to the SCC. Then, 
  76 
if it is found by an independent body (established under the new legislation), that the case 
still warrants judicial review, than the matter could be reviewed by the courts. This would 
not mean that SIRC was a substitute for the SCC: regardless of the prospects of reform, 
the SCC and SIRC must continue to play a complementary role in holding CSIS to 
account, while avoid unnecessary competition and conflict. 
 Finally, such a reform would also provide the political space to address a number 
of other issues that have been discussed above: for example, increasing the scope of 
CSIS’s foreign operations, and increasing the number of intelligence agencies under 
SIRC’s purview. Currently, there are a number of agencies that conduct intelligence 
operations such as the Communication Security Establishment (CSE) and Canada Post 
that do not report to SIRC.  
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 With respect to the SCC, empirical evidence from the three cases examined leads 
to the conclusion that the SCC has been consistent in protecting the balance between the 
interests of state and individual rights by facilitating a dialogue between itself, on one 
hand, and Parliament and the executive branch of government on the other.   
While the Charter has significantly increased the power of the courts to influence 
legislative outcomes, the SCC has been cautious and pragmatic in its exercise of these 
powers, certainly to a greater degree than the proponents of judicial supremacy and/or 
judicial activism assume. Secondly, the SCC continues to have an important role to play 
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in protecting Canadians from the intrusive powers of government, as exercised through 
CSIS. The SCC is a valid alternative to a SIRC review, when the alleged offence is of 
matter of substantive justice, or when a SIRC review has proven incapable of bringing 
about satisfactory results. In this regard, the SCC remains an important element of 
upholding the delicate balance between the rights of citizens and collective interests of 
the state.  That balance is precarious, and requires constant attention, review and 
refinement.  
 This thesis draws attention to the continuing need to re-evaluate the purpose and 
scope of intelligence review, and to determine whether the review function performed by 
the courts continues to meet the expectations of citizens. Judging by the Khadr and 
Charkaoui decisions, it is clear that the SCC is mindful of the interests of state in 
rendering its verdicts. Still, future decisions related to intelligence operations must be 
closely monitored to ensure that the balance is not tipped too far either way.   
 With respect to SIRC, it may be concluded that it has demonstrated a clear 
willingness and capacity to uphold individual rights, while remaining mindful of the 
interests of state, thereby serving to uphold the balance described in the seminal Report 
of the Pitfield/Buckwold Committee. Based on the case studies examined in Chapter 4, 
the following conclusions can be drawn. SIRC’s review processes are similar to those of 
courts in reviewing the activities of CSIS – a point that SIRC makes explicit in its 1989-
1990 Annual Report, (SIRC, 1990). In the review of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, SIRC 
even enlisted the consultation of the Honourable Gérard LaForest, C.C., Q.C., and as a 
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result, the report included considerations and conclusions that might have been expressed 
in a SCC decision. Not only does this exemplify SIRC’s capacity to function like a court, 
but it also exemplifies a more direct inter-institutional dialogue that occurs in the review 
of CSIS.   
In the Heritage Front Affair SIRC demonstrated its willingness to check the 
powers of the executive branch of government by concluding that “current directions 
from the Solicitor General and the Director” should be reexamined and refined (SIRC, 
1994: 13. 11). Supporting the notion that judicial review is a manifestation of an ongoing 
dialogue, the Solicitor General issued three new Ministerial Directives concerning the 
‘management of human sources’. In what dialogue theorists may refer to as a “second 
look case”, SIRC issued a follow-up report in which it determined that the Ministerial 
response did not sufficiently address the need for greater policy guidance in this area.  
 
5.3 Points for Further Discussion 
 “Canada’s history in the field of security intelligence…teaches us that it is 
foresight and opportunity, not crisis and scandal, which should be the spurs to building 
[an effective review system]” (SIRC, 1999). Information exchanges between CSIS and its 
counterparts in other countries have come under close inspection by SIRC in the post- 
9/11 period, as intelligence agencies around the world have begun to take on increasingly 
cooperative relationships (SIRC, 2009: 11). However, these exchanges create concerns 
when they include states which do not “share Canada’s respect for human rights” (Ibid.). 
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This has forced some to question CSIS’s loyalty to Canada, and its commitment to its 
upholding Canadian laws and values (Ibid.). 
 CSIS is not fully mandated to conduct foreign intelligence activities; thus it has 
been forced to establish robust intelligence networks with foreign intelligence agencies 
such as the CIA, FBI, MI5, and Mossad (Israeli intelligence), amongst others. While 
SIRC has required CSIS to provide information on its intelligence links, it has not yet 
sought to examine any of these associations.  
 In the 2009-2010 Annual Report, SIRC reviewed how CSIS’s foreign intelligence 
responsibilities have evolved over the years (SIRC, 2010: 7). After learning that 
considerable changes have taken place in this area, SIRC put the question to the Minister 
of Public Safety, Tony Clement, through its Section 54 review of CSIS’s foreign 
intelligence program, as to whether a separate foreign intelligence service should be 
established. This seems to reflect SIRC’s commitment to work with government on the 
issues around foreign intelligence.  
 In October 2010, a spokesperson from SIRC called upon Public Safety Minister, 
Vic Toews, and asked him to consider the idea of a separate foreign intelligence service, 
and he proposed a national debate on the issue (The Canadian Press, 2010a). CSIS 
Director, Richard Fadden, has indicated that such a service could be operational in three 
years (Mansbridge, 2010). 
 Based on the evidence included and beyond this paper, there is capacity within 
SIRC and the SCC to oversee a more expansive, international role for CSIS. However, 
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this does not imply that such an agency is in line with Canadian interests. Nor should it 
be taken to necessarily imply that the threats to Canadians security merit the 
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